Chapter Eight: Walls Fall Down

The Doctor Examined, or Why William Thornton Did Not Design the Octagon House or the Capitol

by Bob Arnebeck

 Table of Contents   

Chapter Eight: Walls Fall Down

72. Robert Morris house in Philadelphia where the president lived and worked

In mid-February, 1795, the New York Minerva, immediately followed by the Boston Orrey and Philadelphia's Gazette of the United States, printed a three part "Essay on the City of Washington." Since it was also printed in French, one scholar suggests that Hallet wrote it.(1) However, Greenleaf had several French employees including Mr. Henry who he paid to project ideas about the world capital soon to be built. Another Greenleaf brother-in-law, Noah Webster, was publisher of the Minerva.

The essay primarily celebrated the economic and cultural importance of the city, and it also championed Hallet's Capitol and especially its court yard:

The capitol which is constructed on the plan drawn by Mr. Hallet, will be one of the most spacious of modern edifices.... The architecture is masculine and bold. The details are elegant and the ornaments well adjusted.... The court of this building is spacious and regular, it enlightens the interior and facilitates the communications; it will be embellished with a colonnade of the Doric order; in the center will be placed the altar of liberty, around which the United States will be represented under the figure of young women which will be closely joined together.

75. Essay extolling Hallet's design

There remains no known reaction to the essay, even after it was published in the fall of 1796 by the Washington Gazette. Unfortunately for Thornton, thanks to three letters, one that he delivered himself, the time was not ripe for a frank discussion with the president about the Capitol. He left for Philadelphia on February 23, met with the secretary of state on the 27th, handed him a three page letter on the dispute with Johnson, likely written by Scott. Before Thornton arrived the president received a letter from Commissioner Carroll regretting that ill health forced him to submit his resignation. A few days later the president had a letter in hand from ex-commissioner Stuart warning that in regards to the dispute with Johnson "the Commissioners are in my opinion in an error; and have acted with too much precipitation." Carroll's replacement had to be "a ⟨Law⟩ character of considerable eminence." Left unsaid but clearly implied was that Scott and Thornton had to be checked.

Randolph immediately sent a note to the president that "He purposes to wait upon the President immediately after breakfast, upon the subject of Mr Johnson’s letter, respecting his water-lot. If the President has not answered it, he will perceive from the information, brought up by Dr Thornton, that something is wrong in this business." Randolph didn't mention the loan, the university or the Capitol.(3) Thornton immediately sent off a letter to Scott and confessed that he was ill.(2) Scott immediately wrote back that he was "vexed" that Thornton was unwell at such a "critical time." Scott took pressure off Thornton vis-a-vis the diminutive Johnson. The commissioners would easily win "a law suit to be instituted [by] the Tom Thumb Hero of Frederick standing in Greenleaf's shoes." But he stressed Thornton about loan. Even though Scott had been against getting a loan, he coached Thornton on what kind of loan to negotiate and urged him to "write to me by every post."(4) 

Thornton rallied. That month, he wrote only two more letters to his colleagues, without mentioning the dispute with Johnson. As for loan, in his first letter, posted March 13, he gently suggested it was up to himself and "the Executive" to determine the terms of the loan. By that time, he had already met again with the secretary of state, and also met with the attorney general and the president. He wrote just after he met with the president but his letter was mostly about his meeting with the attorney general. Rather than simply reveal what was decided, Thornton tried to explain interest rates. In England, 5% was the highest permissible interest, in Maryland 6%. For reasons he didn't explain, he observed that "therefore it may be necessary to conclude the loan in New Jersey  (or New York) where 7 percentum are allowed..." He added that the secretary of state wanted the money as soon as possible and thought "that the interest... is no object." 

Then he explained that money was in short supply in Philadelphia, and a loan proposal had to be sent to London. He had fussed with the attorney general over getting a power of attorney notarized so an agent in London could negotiate a loan: would a mayor be better than a county judge? His colleagues wrote back immediately. They tried to take control of the situation by getting documents notarized. They also warned Thornton to avoid language that would make the commissioners personally liable for the loan. They also warned him not to mortgage all the remaining lots leaving them none to sell. They referred him to a letter they just sent to the secretary of state for "details of the affairs of the city." In that letter, they worried about what Thornton was doing: “We presume from the Doctors letter to us, that it is intended to pledge the whole remaining property of the City to secure the repayment of the principal and interest of these Loans. Before this negotiation is finally closed we wish the President to be informed that we much fear that a mortgage of the whole remaining property of the City may lead to difficulties of a serious nature.”(5)

A year later, another commissioner would navigate a process that did get a loan. Thornton's efforts didn't. Nonetheless, historians have hailed Thornton's Philadelphia trip as a singular accomplishment. That said, Thornton was never again sent to Philadelphia on the board's business.(6) In regards to getting loans, Thornton was clearly not the leading commissioner. But what about the Capitol?

Thornton understood that in order to see the president he had to go through the secretary of state. Randolph had been alerted by the board that a decision had to be made about the foundation, and, as Thornton put it in a letter to his colleagues, "from what I have heard the Secretary of State say with regard to the foundation of the Capitol he thinks favorably of it, but desired my opinion...." Evidently, he also learned from Randolph that the president was very busy. What was probably worse for Thornton, the dispute with Johnson and the challenge of replacing Carroll were much on the president's mind. On March 6, he wrote to Johnson: "No opinion of mine, on the nature of it, has yet been given; nor, if it respects property, or the construction of a contract, may there be propriety in my doing it. Sincerely do I wish, however, that this dispute had not arisen; & as sincerely that it could be amicably adjusted upon principles of strict justice." On March 8, Tobias Lear wrote to him and reported that the general opinion in Georgetown was that the lots could not be fairly considered water lots since they were on the other side of  a bridge that blocked masted ships. The president likely he had that letter in hand when he met with Thornton. 

Then he also had to address the vacancy on the board. In his letter to Johnson he added: "To fill it with a well qualified character, in its various relations & duties, is of high importance to the welfare of the City. But where is this character to be found? Doctr Stuart has named one, who in his opinion, would answer well; but I stand committed to none, nor for none, nor shall I, before I visit the city." His worries on that score likely added a chill to his reception of his last appointment to board who was a source of the problem with Johnson. He probably was uncertain if Thornton, whom he had never met on a matter of official business before, was a friend or an enemy.

Judging from the two letters Thornton sent to his colleagues on March 13 and 25, his March 12 meeting with the president did not amount to much. The president "desired my opinion" on raising the foundation "which I gave yesterday, observing that you had some objections, which however principally regarded expense of money and time. I thought it proper to leave it until an interview with you would bring forward any other objections.... He thinks it of great importance to give the Capitol as much grandeur as possible and not to consider present considerations as much as future ones. I know we are unanimously of his opinion provided we can accommodate our present circumstances to our idea. To effect this we must leave nothing undone with respect to the loan."(9) His colleagues wrote back: "we are of opinion any changes in the present plan of the Capitol would be attended with consequences very fatal to the affairs of the city." In his letter of the 25th, he alluded to the meeting again and opined that the president would not decide on the foundation "till he sees you." If they urgently needed an opinion, that "may induce him to fix, but I do not know how he will act."

The fact that Thornton did draft reports on the Capitol design and then met with the president about the foundation seems to be confirming evidence that the president began a relationship with him that, if not at that meeting then later, resulted in his being asked to restore his design. However, the atmospherics surrounding the meeting suggest otherwise. The president was unlikely to entrust Thornton with making changes to the Capitol design. The president certainly did not tip his hand that way at the March 12 meeting since after it Thornton wrote "I do not know how he will act."

The very long letter Thornton gave to the president, but did not share with his colleagues, only addressed the foundation not his others reports on the basement, and leveling and landscaping the city. Most of what was written in his letter was probably not said to the president. But the letter marks a shift in his thinking. Thornton presented a vision of the Capitol that ignored any controversy with Hallet. He didn't allude to the East Front that remained unresolved at the July 1793 conference. In his letter, he called the East Front the "back" of the building and only complained that the foundation "was laid unnecessarily deep, which not only sank much money, but wasted time." Instead, he focused on the West Front. 

Thornton came up with a new way to look at the Capitol. But, he first took the president to task: "It is to be lamented that the Capitol was placed so far to the west of the Hill." Then, he redeemed the president's mistake. "It is however better a little to the west than on the very summit; because, independent of the View, the Ground in filling up will take the Form of the Building, and give to it when finished an uncommonly dignified appearance. To effect this the Earth should slope away regularly, and when Steps are made round the semicircular part, from the Terrace, to the Park below, the whole will exhibit the magnificence of a Roman Temple." Did the glowing description of Hallet's East Front court yard in the recently published essay prompt Thornton to shift the president's eyes to the West Front?

As to whether to level the hill or raise the foundation, in his letter, Thornton reduced the problem to a formula: "...the Expense is in an inverse Ratio to the increased height of the foundation." He gave the exact expense down to the last penny for the raising foundation by 10, 9, 6, or 3 feet, or keeping the current level. Then he made the whole table of figures somewhat moot by saying that his calculations were  based on the assumption the earth would be removed from all of the Capitol Square and all the roads leading to it for "a considerable distance." The government would not have the will or means to do that for another 50 years. 

In the letter, there was no fuss and bother about Hallet's foundation marring the future of the building. The mar-plotters at the moment was his cost conscious colleagues who wanted brick makers to level the ground. Thornton distinguished himself from his colleagues: "when we consider that this is a work for the Accommodation of future Ages, and the Capitol of a great and increasing people, it would be a matter of universal Condemnation: were we to sacrifice so noble a monument of Splendor, for the sake of so trivial and time-serving a Consideration."(10)

The president did not reply to the letter. On March 30, the president invited Thornton for tea "this Evening 7 o'clock in a family way." If Thornton ever described his tea with the president, the description has been lost. It is possible that the president invited Thornton to tea simply to let the commissioner know he had an eye on him. In his March 25 letter to his colleagues, Thornton said he planned to leave Philadelphia shortly and the president gave him a letter to deliver to the board. Yet, Thornton lingered in the city.

He attended to personal matters. According to a note in Thornton's papers, on March 30, he bought a horse. About this time, Thornton put a down payment on a 572 1/2 acre farm six miles from Georgetown just across the boundary line with Maryland. Later that year another fellow of the American Philosophical Society congratulated him: "You are not contented with marble monuments to your name, but you will have it transmitted by the choice breed of Thornton horses, the Thornton pigs, Thornton goat, etc., etc, etc." He attended a meeting of the society and likely joined the discussion on a prospectus for a contest for the best essay on a system of liberal education.(11) Thornton didn't return to Georgetown until April 9.

Before Thornton left Philadelphia, Johnson wrote to the president appealing to their long friendship: "It is mortifying that an old Man, having almost crossed the Stage, cannot quietly quit it without being kickt at behind by Envy personified in young Men; however some Times, instead of the old Fellow’s falling on his Nose, the Blade kicks so wonton and high that he falls on his Back himself and draws on him the contemptuous Laughter of the Spectators—"   

The president reached Georgetown on the 18th and went to Mount Vernon the next day. In the meanwhile, ex-commissioner Johnson had sued the board. On April 20, Thornton and Scott sent the president a packet of documents and Johnson's offensive letters. In their long cover letter, they accused Johnson of "partiality, knavery and utter ignorance." The letter revealed both commissioners' passionate belief that they were right. The president wrote back that "having got into a course of legal adjudication, it is unnecessary for me to express any sentiment thereon. I regret that it could not be settled without, because good rarely flow[s] from disputes—evil often."(12)

It bears noting that the president did not ask Thornton and Scott who they would like for a colleague. On April 20, the president wrote to Edward Carrington and begged him to replace Commissioner Carroll: "It is of the highest consequence to this Union, and to the Southern States in particular, that the public buildings in the federal city (intended for the accomodation of Congress after the year 1800) and the other interests of that establishment should be pushed with vigor....an energetic successor is not only very interesting to the public & difficult, but is also of much solicitude with me;..."(13)

That he was a lawyer was Carrington's least qualification. He had commanded artillery during the Revolution and much more. His work as a scout and quartermaster saved the Southern army. When whiskey taxes had to be collected in Virginia, U.S. Marshal Carrington did the job. As the president expected, Carrington declined but for a few days, he could hope for decisive leadership in the federal city.

The president met the board on April 27. He looked at the site of the Capitol and decided to raise the foundation by 6 feet. He also took Thornton aside. He later described the conversation to Commissioner Carroll: "He, any more than Mr Johnson, seemed to think this [mediation] could not be accomplished, as the Commissioners (or whether he confined it more particularly to Mr Scott and himself, I am not certain) were clearly of opinion, and had been so advised by professional men, that the lots upon Rock Creek would, undoubtedly, be considered as water lots under Greenleafs contract; and being so considered and of greater value, it followed as a consequence, that they, as trustees of public property in the City, could not yield to a claim which would establish a principle injurious to that property. He added that they had taken pains to investigate this right, and was possessed of a statement thereof which he or they (I am not sure which) wished me to look at."

76. At issue: the truncated square west of Square 4
The next day, the president appointed Alexander White to replace Carroll. The 57 year old former two term Virginia congressman was the lawyer Stuart suggested.
 
Meanwhile, Thornton had the perfect occasion to raise issues relating to the Capitol design. The board informed the president on May 15 that they had ended Hallet's hopes of getting his job back. They had "indulged him some time last winter with a full hearing in the presence of such of his friends as he wished; and upon full consideration determined it was by no means adviseable to take him again into the public service." They had not mentioned the hearing to the president when it happened. After all, the old board never informed him of their problems with Hallet. What prompted their late report was a letter pushed into the hands of the president as he rode through Georgetown on his way back to Philadelphia.
 
Hallet's son put a letter from his mother into the president's hand. In her letter, Mary Gomain Hallet described the situation at the Capitol in June 1794: "you cannot but remember that my husband’s plan has been preferred to all others, that the foundations were laid after that plan and under his direction.... I could indeed plead that his plan having been adopted, nobody can as well as he understand, its ensemble and Distributions; nobody may have the Same reasons for a careful watch over the execution even of the minutest parts.... I might represent that he must have a perfect knowledge of architecture, who could alone point out the deficiency of the rewarded plan, and Shew how much it was exceptionable in the true principles of architecture...."

In his reply, Washington implied that he didn't appreciate Hallet letting his wife plead his case: "It is painful to me to receive the complaint of Mr. Hallet through you. It is more so, because I see no propriety in my interfering in the differences between the commissioners and him." Apropos Hallet's dismissal, he added: "Why Mr. Hallet left the business in which he was employed by them [the commissioners]; - or why he was discontinued, is better known, perhaps to you, than it is to me." 

The president asked the commissioners if he had been justly compensated. He enclosed her letter and his reply, and, if they approved, asked them to send it to her, which they did.(15) Why Thornton did not correct her version of events is unknown. Along with Scott, he was cutting ties with others who he likely viewed as troublesome including Monsieur Blois and the Collen Williamson. The latter was an aging, cranky, anti-Irish and a racist, but he had almost finished the second story of the President's house. Thwarting the president's hope that they would reconcile with Johnson likely added to their sense of power.

Thornton and Scott didn't seem to sense the president's unease with their way of conducting business. Or they thought good news would ameliorate it. After their short summary of Hallet's hearing, they added: "We are happy in having it in our power to inform you that the Capitol progresses rapidly...." Then they tried to silence Johnson. They sent back his latest letter unopened and accused him of indecency and insanity:

We conceive it peculiarly indecent in you, having been in public Life, to offer Insults to us as Servants of the public; more especially, as decent Language was returned by us to all the disgraceful Epithets of your former Letters. We are willing to attribute the whole of your Conduct to a derangement of Mind, which we lament: and therefore consider you rather as an Object of pity than of Resentment. We return your last Letter, and refuse all further Communication, ’till a Return of Reason point out the propriety of using at least the Language of a Gentleman. 

Thornton likely wrote the attack. He was prone to "lament." In response, Johnson wrote to the president and asked for "an Investigation of their Conduct and mine." The president understood that to mean that Johnson wanted an official public inquiry, and it took him three weeks to reply. He did not want an inquiry unless Scott and Thornton failed in their "several duties." However, the president did not lose his respect for Johnson. In August, a scandal forced Randolph to resign. The president asked Johnson to be the new secretary of state. That portfolio included supervising the commissioners. Johnson declined the opportunity to make life miserable for Thornton and Scott.(16)

In a May letter to the newly appointed commissioner Alexander White, the president detailed how disappointed he was with Thornton and Scott: 

In short, the only difference I could perceive between the proceedings of the old, and the new commissioners result⟨ed⟩ from the following comparison. The old met not oftener than once a month, except on particular occasions; the new meet once or twice a week. In the interval, the old resided at their houses in the country; the new reside at their houses in George Town. The old... were obliged ⟨to⟩ trust to overseers, and superintendants to look to the execution; the new have gone more into the execution of it by contracts, and piece work, but rely equally, I fear, on others to see to the performance. These changes (tho’ for the better) by no means apply a radical cure to the evils that were complained of, nor will they justify the difference of compensation....

That letter dumbfounded White who replied that he knew nothing about "architecture" or managing workers. He had second thoughts about taking the job and given his personal business would probably not join his new colleagues until October.(17) Exactly why is not known, but White soon relented and did his duty.

At the same time White sent his second thoughts, three hundred feet of foundation walls for both the North and South wings fell down. That was all of that year's work. Work would resume only on the North Wing. Both houses of congress would have to meet there in 1800. The president did not lecture Thornton and Scott. He left that to Randolph who put it this way: "The President will by no means suppose, nor does he mean in the most distant manner to insinuate, that due attention was not paid by the Commissioners to the running up of the walls of the Capitol, but it may happen in some other instance that a similar fatality might take place which would be prevented by the watchful inspection of the Commissioners...."

Thornton and Scott wrote to Randolph placing all the blame on a dispute between the contractors and their workers. The walls also had been under Hoban's inspection, and "one or the other of the board has frequently visited them." They also complained of how irksome it was to have anything to do with the men doing and supervising the work: "Those not acquainted with the motley set we found here and who from necessity have too many of them been continued in public employment can form no adequate idea of the irksome scenes we are too often compelled to engage in. The friend of Sir Ludovic Grant is one of the many to whom we allude." Both commissioners shared those sentiments, but Thornton likely wrote the letter. He knew Sir Ludovic Grant for whom Collen Williamson boasted of having designed and built stone castles in Scotland.(18)

Despite the strain the collapse of the walls caused between the board and the administration everyone conspired to minimize reports of the damage. The board conducted an investigation only to assign blame so that the culprit would pay damages. For years they carried on their account book that contractor Cornelius McDermott Roe owed $1264 for damages to the North Wing and $1470 for damages to the South Wing.

No one investigated the board's role in the collapse. Roe had a piece work contract that the board boasted would save money and speed up the work. But there had been problems. On April 22, 1795, Roe had written to the board asking for the architect to give directions.  While Roe was a contractor who hired his own masons, he did rely on the commissioners to supply him with slave laborers to move the stone. He had also complained in April and May of not having enough stone thus leaving the slaves with no work.(19)

No one seems to have written a description of what remained of the foundations until Latrobe did in his April 1803 report to President Jefferson on the state of the building: "Having understood that the foundation walls of the South wing... had not been faithfully executed," he had the walls "opened in several places and at different levels." He found stones "loosely thrown between between two external casings without mortar." All that had to be taken down. "Below which I am well informed that the work has been faithfully performed."(20) The work that had been faithfully performed was done before Thornton became a commissioner. The rest was done after he became a commissioner and paid a salary expressly to see that work was done properly.

So much for Thornton's claim in the unsent portion of the draft of his March 12 letter to the president that "it shall be my particular study to accommodate the original to the present foundation, leaving out all difficulties or parts which the most common artificer cannot execute." In the extant letters written at the time that discussed the debacle, there was no reference as to what design informed the errant masons. Likely, the work involved building the foundation walls for the North and South Wings laid under Hallet's direction higher. However, in 1801, Thornton, who was then the senior commissioner, told Hoban to design and build an elliptical room on the site of the South Wing to serve as a temporary chamber for the House of Representatives. He required Hoban to use the foundation already laid for an elliptical colonnade that may have been laid at his insistence in 1795. However, it may also have been laid to accommodate Hallet's oval chamber for the House rather than Thornton's. There is no evidence that Thornton regretted the necessity of only continuing work on the North Wing. By way, the walls built in 1802 on the 1795 foundation soon threatened to fall over and had to be buttressed.(21)

Thornton's first nine months as a commissioner did not burnish his credentials as an architect. He didn't show any acumen superintending construction and had done nothing to restore the reputation of his prize winning design. Evidence was accumulating that no one in his right mind would ask Thornton to have anything to do with building his house.

However, professional architects in the city had scarcely made a reputation for themselves. Their employer failed. Greenleaf's agent in Holland was unable to raise enough money in loans to cover the checks the speculators wrote to buy federal city lots and Western lands. The money Greenleaf made off selling lots to Law and another Nabob, William Duncanson, went to save his Western speculations. 

77. Thomas Law in 1796
 
Greenleaf decided to tighten the belt on his federal city operations. He stopped the stream of money to Lovering and Clark until there was an accounting of what had already been spent. Greenleaf's French accountant was not nice about it. Clark submitted a statement showing that the speculator owed him $33,000. The accountant calculated that Clark owed Greenleaf $30,000. That discrepancy soon unhinged Clark's mind and his wife Isabella came to his defense in a four page letter to Greenleaf. She scoffed that the accountant was “a french Mutilated Aristocrat, a french Poltroon, Miscreant Ruffian,” who instituted a reign of terror. She insisted that her husband had sacrificed his all for Greenleaf. She blamed Greenleaf's "Myrmydons ...for murdering my Husbands Intellect by Minutia."(22)
79. Clark's four buildings which he had left unfinished
The problem was that in the sunshine of Greenleaf's largess, all accounts in the city were blended. Lovering, Clark, Simmons and Lewis Deblois, a 35 year old New Englander who had married Sen. Tristram Dalton's daughter and worked only for Nicholson, had all shared the building materials Greenleaf had sent down from New England. Lovering also suffered from  Greenleaf's sudden stinginess.(23)

Thanks to stones jamming the mechanism, the newly invented brick-making machines Greenleaf bought did not make enough bricks, even though he had four. The builders bought bricks that were made the old fashioned way from Daniel Carroll of Duddington. Original proprietors of the land had no building requirement, so they made money selling building materials, especially bricks, to speculators who had to build. The contractors thought Greenleaf, who had promised an unlimited supply of bricks, should pay the $1,500 bill. He didn't. Carroll was not amused. He wrote to Greenleaf: "I wish you to consider that my bricks are in your houses...." Then he sued Lovering and Clark.(24)

On July 10, 1795, Greenleaf "sold" his share of the investment in the city to his partners Morris and Nicholson, and "bought" their shares in the North American Land Company. The partners had formed the latter with all their Western land as its capital and offered stock in the company. "Sold" and "bought" are in quotes because no money changed hands. Nicholson and Greenleaf soon warred in the newspapers over who cheated who in the accounting of the transaction.(25) 

Every gentleman in America knew of Robert Morris's wealth and service as Financier during the Revolution. He was the  president's dear friend, and landlord. In Philadelphia, he lived in Morris's townhouse near the State House where congress sat. Thornton likely had paid attention to the mansion L'Enfant designed and was then building for Morris in Philadelphia. Thornton may have known John Nicholson better than the president did. Like Thornton, he was a member of the American Philosophical Society and like Thornton helped John Fitch and the steamboat company. He also courted the Democratic Society. Nicholson's swindling the State of Pennsylvania while serving as its comptroller and subsequent impeachment, that he survived, were the stuff of common gossip. 

Given a choice, the better sort preferred dealing with Morris. Thornton contacted Morris to make sure his purchase of lots from Greenleaf was not in jeopardy. Morris assured him that the lots were his, got him to  pay another installment of  $1,354.10, and used that money to pay Clark's disgruntled unpaid workers.(26) Both the president and commissioners knew that by buying out Greenleaf, Morris and Nicholson assumed the burden of paying  the commissioners $50,000 a year that, it was assumed, would finance construction of the public buildings. Greenleaf was behind on payments. The president assumed the burden of dunning the speculators, but immediately passed it off to Randolph. Men who lived off plantations and a government salary had difficulty relating professionally to high rollers like Morris and Nicholson who, unlike Greenleaf, refused to be ingratiating.(27)

An architect trying to make a living could not be so shy. William Lovering went to Philadelphia to offer his services. He had pressing reasons to call on Morris and Nicholson. Rather than pay him 8% of the cost of the buildings, Greenleaf had put him on a salary which seemed to guarantee some money in lieu of haggling over the cost of the buildings, but Greenleaf still did not pay him. In Philadelphia, Lovering charmed Morris who agreed to continue the $1500 salary and have Lovering supervise all other builders. Morris grandly headed his first letter to the one man now in charge: "Mr. William Lovering, Architect at City Washington." Nicholson agreed to use Lovering too and pay half his salary. Lovering landed on his feet but he was on shaky ground. Morris also hired William Cranch who had replaced Dr. Appleton. He too was Greenleaf's brother-in-law also Vice President Adams' nephew. Morris advised Cranch that as for "Mr. Lovering's debts and the balance due to him [just over $3000] gain as much time as you can...." Neither Lovering nor anyone else Greenleaf hired ever received any more money under the contracts they made with Greenleaf. Morris made a start at fulfilling his contractual agreement with Lovering. He promptly sent $50 to Cranch to give to Lovering. Then Morris told Cranch that "it seems almost time for the City of Washington to support itself."(28) Meanwhile, Randolph met with Morris who said a payment was imminent. None came and the president wrote to him, and, in reply, Morris explained Greenleaf's false promises, the French invasion of Holland, his empty pockets, and the failure of the Nabob, Thomas Law, to loan him money.(29)

Law had been dumbfounded by the request. Despite all the money Law paid out to Greenleaf, the commissioners had not given him deeds because Greenleaf was in arrears in his payments. Law asked for deeds anyway and Scott and Thornton said they had to await the arrival of the new commissioner. Greenleaf accused them of thwarting Law because he wanted to develop New Jersey Avenue southeast of the Capitol. In a letter to Randolph, Scott and Thornton accused Greenleaf of being "a malignant slanderer."(30)

With an experienced politician, as well as a lawyer, on the board, the accusatory tone of its letters ended. Commissioner Alexander White probably liked Thornton more, but usually sided with Scott to check Thornton's impossible ideas. For example, the merchant James Barry needed a ruling on where he could extend his wharf into the river. White and Scott advised the president to let a street be extended to the water with the understanding that a Water Street would someday run parallel to the river. They also advised letting warehouses on wharves have only one fireplace. Thornton advised the president that completing Water Street paralleling the whole shore line was paramount. It was drawn into the plan. Most great ports had one. He pointed out places where made ground could be extended into the river to the extent of two or three city squares. He also pointed out that merchants often had their counting house in their warehouses with many rooms to accommodate clerks. They should be allowed more than one fireplace. The president waited for Thornton to write his very long dissent and then agreed with White and Scott.(31)

As for the pressing need to save money, in a letter to his colleagues Thornton proposed that they hire "50 intelligent negroes for six years." By "negroes" he meant slaves. "Two or three" skilled stone cutters would teach the slaves how to cut stone. Better yet the board could purchase the slaves and thus "no interference of the owners could then take place." Then the slaves would "have their liberty at the expiration of  5 or 6 years."

Thornton's colleagues, both slave owners, did not officially respond to Thornton's proposal, and thus it never came to the president's attention. At the same time, his colleagues did not worry that Thornton had radical ideas. They could see that he was comfortable with slavery. On June 17, 1795, he had bought two slaves in Georgetown who were "honest, sober and free from all bodily complaint." He had also joined his colleagues in signing an order increasing the number of laborers, mostly hired slaves, to 100. In December 1794, Scott hired out two of his own slaves to work on the public buildings. Thornton eventually hired out one of his. On October 7, 1796,  the board paid him $16.67 for three months work by one of his slaves.(32)

Toward the end of the summer, the president got a letter endorsing Thornton in the most glowing terms. It came from Lettsom who was writing to find someone interested in planting "turkey rhubarb" in America. He also offered his "sincere Thanks for the kindness shewn to a relation and Countryman of mine, whose virtues will do thy patronage no discredit. Dr Thornton to whom I allude, has a heart—an openness, a candour, and an ingenuous disposition; that, I think, are more amiably combined in his character, than in any I ever knew; and I trust, the more he is known to thee, the more thou wilt observe it."(33)

Lettsom's letter pointed out Thornton's only saving grace: he amiably combined openness, candor and an ingenuous disposition. The president could have applied those adjectives to his performance thus far as a commissioner. Thanks to his naivety, i.e. ingenuous disposition, Thornton did not have to be taken seriously. Conversely, convinced of his own genius and conviction that he was right, Thornton didn't seem to care that he was not being taken seriously. Around this time, two years after his "rewarded" design was shot down by Hallet, he once again put his pencil to work on a design for the Capitol. Evidently, no one took him seriously, then, nor have his biographers and most historians of the Capitol.

In November, the president would write to the commissioners that "in my late visits" to the city he was informed that "a dome over the open or circular area or lobby" was not "part of the original design of the Capitol."(34) The president's thinking that there would be no dome as depicted in Hallet's and Thornton's elevations of the East Front is hard to explain. The context for the comment will be explored in the next chapter, but a possible seed for the rumor may have been planted by the new elevation of the Capitol that Thornton drew in the summer of 1795 that made the Capitol look like a Roman temple.

In his 1900 history of the Capitol, Glenn Brown drew and published what the West Front of the Thornton's award winning design must have looked like. He labeled it "Drawing of William Thornton's intended design for the west front by Glenn Brown 1900." He also noted that it was "restored from original plans and east elevation."(35)

However, there is a West Front of the Capitol in Thornton's papers at the Library of Congress. That elevation is now known as his "alternative" Capitol design. It restored the small, columned porticos at both ends of the building, and turned the glory of the building to the west. It showed the advantage of the raised foundation by mounting it with a high colonnade topped with what is now described as a "high dome." But the president expected the dome to form the ceiling of a room, and not to be hoisted by a colonnade and serving as an exalted ornament.
 
A late 20th century architect, Don Hawkins, made a model combining the design elements in Thornton's east and west fronts. Other historians speculate that given the precarious financial situation, he offered an alternative design that might be cheaper.(36)
 
82. Don Hawkin's model of Thornton East and West Fronts combined

There is no evidence that Thornton or any contemporary wrote about his alternative design. If the soaring colonnade had been part of the design picked over by Hallet and others, it likely would have been noted. But what else could the president have had in mind in 1795 when he expressed surprise at talk of a building without a dome where he expected one to be?
 
In 1795 or early 1796, Thornton also designed a church. In an undated letter to the church's board, Thornton noted that the foundation as laid would not admit of his design being built. The Georgetown church now called St. John's was finished in 1804 without any of the elements that Thornton mentioned his letter. He wanted a circular steeple and colonnade, likely akin to the Roman temple effect he began to crave for the Capitol. He did allow in the letter that his elevation for the church was uncommon.(37)
   
While Thornton was frustrated in his attempts to open up a discussion with the president about any design feature more than the Capitol's foundation, the board as a whole did make a change in the building's floor plan. They added a room. Hoban seems to have been the catalyst. White first informed the president of the change. White reiterated his understanding of how the commissioners should regard the plan for the Capitol. They were "to execute the Plans of the President and not to alter them..." That said, White thought the room should be added and told the president that Hoban did too. "It will throw the building into a more regular proportion upon the general principles of the Plan agreed to by the President than the strict execution of the Plan itself—and render further alterations unnecessary—that it will be a very great saving on the whole execution of the work, altho’ the expense of the present Wing may be somewhat augmented, but in consequence of that additional expense one hansome room will be added to it." Having already confessed to the president that he knew nothing about architecture, White was careful to get the opinion of an architect, Hoban. White added that the board was sending Thornton to Mount Vernon to confer with the president, but that was likely his colleagues way of consoling him for their taking the Hoban's advice. If Thornton went, it didn't register in the president's diary, and Thornton never mentioned it.(38) 
 
It seems that no one took his 1795 designs, either of the Capitol or church, that seriously. His high colonnades were as puzzling as his scheme to buy slaves to cut stone, or his vision of clerks warming themselves by fires in warehouses built on acres of what was once river. However, Hallet was gone, the foundation was higher, rough cut stone was being prepared for what was called the basement story. Undoing the "wilful errors" of professional architects did not preclude Thornton from staking his enduring fame on a bolder design for the Capitol. Then in the fall of 1795, another architect tried to do that.

Thornton confronted a controversy he thought he had forestalled. His pleasing acquisition from England, thirty-two year old George Hadfield, came to town and Thornton shared his Georgetown house until Hadfield could find a home closer to the Capitol. He then immediately decided not to behave as Trumbull had assured Thornton he would. Trumbull had written to Thornton that he had known Hadfield for ten years and "in his profession he is modest and unassuming....and should any difficulties occur to him in the executive parts of the plan, he will suggest his objections with candour leaving the decision to your judgement."

"Unassuming" he was not. When he signed his employment contract, he "requested permission in the presence of the full board" to give them his opinion "respecting the state of the building, after having procured the designs and examined the work." Shortly after that, he dutifully came back with his opinion: "I find the building begun but do not find the necessary Plans to carry on a work of this importance, and I think there are defects that are not warrantable, in most of the branches that constitute the profession of an Architect, Stability - Economy - Convenience - Beauty...."(39)

He did allow that he would do his best "adapt" to the parts already done. Then he suggested "omitting the basement." By doing that the Senate and House chambers would be "on the principal part of the building" and not in the basement. Plus the portico would "not be useless" and "grandeur" would be increased. He then turned his attention to the foundation, and opined that "it was not in a state to be depended upon." Finally, all his changes would make the building cheaper to build and more logical. He showed a new elevation and floor plan to the board.

In the ensuing battle, Thornton's biographers would find much ammunition to prove his genius as an architect. However, contemporaries did not even see it as a dispute between Hadfield and Thornton. They saw it as a dispute between Hadfield and Hoban. 

Go to Chapter Nine  

Footnotes for Chapter 8:

1. Scott, Pamela, Washington History Mag., vol. 3 no. 1, "L'Enfant's Washington Described". In Through a Fiery Trial , I credited Thomas Law for sponsoring if not writing the essay.

2. Gazette of the United States, February 11, 12, 13; Federal Orrery, Feb 16, 1795; Washington Gazette September 23, 26, November 19, December 7, 1796. Read on-line at www.rarenewspapers 

3.  Carroll to GW 19 February 1795; Randolph to GW, 27 February 1795; Commrs. to GW 20 April 1795

4. Carroll and Scott to Thornton, 20 March 1795 Scott to WT, 4 March 1795. The published Papers of William Thornton doesn't include any of the correspondence between Thornton and Scott.

5. WT to Commrs, 13 March 1795; Commrs. to WT 20 March 1795; footnote #2 in Carroll to GW, 10 May 1795.

6. William Allen, History of Capitol, p. 29; Commrs to Randolf , 20 March 1795; Wells to Randolph, 6 July 1795 in Commrs.' records. Following the lead of Glenn Brown, others conclude that Thornton raised a loan. See also GW to Commrs 30 October 1795.

7.  Harris, p. 311.

8. Harris, pp. 307-13; Carroll to GW, 15 August 1795.

9. WT to GW 12 March 1795.; Carroll and Scott to Thornton, 24 March 1795; WT to Commrs. 25 March 1795.

10. WT to GW 12 March 1795.

11. Allen Clark, "Doctor and Mrs. Thornton", p. 168; Ibid., p. 167; WT to Lettsom, 26 November 1795, Pettigrew 2 pp. 549-55; For horse, see Thornton Papers reel 7. Amer. Phil. Soc. Minutes; WT to Commrs. 25 March 1795; Wistar to WT Sept. 16, 1795, Harris p. 326.

12. Commrs. to GW 20 April 1795; GW to Commrs. 24 April 1795; for more on the dispute with Johnson see Scott to Thornton. 13 March 1795, Thornton Papers LOC.   Johnson to Commrs, 11, 13, 15 February, 4, 5, 6, 15 and 18, 1795; Commrs to Johnson 15 and 18 February 1795; Commrs to Randolph 21 February 1795;

12A. Johnson to GW 21 March 1795; Lear to GW 8 March 1795

13. Johnson to GW  28 February 1795; Stuart to GW 22 February 1795,  GW to Carrington, 20 April 1795  

14. GW to Carroll, 17 May 1795;   Lear to GW, 8 March 1795,

15. Mary Gomain Hallet to GW, 27 April 1795, reply 5 May 1795; GW to Commrs 5 May 1795; Commrs to GW, 15 May 1795

16. Commrs. to Johnson, 10 June 1795; Johnson to GW, 15 June 1795; GW to Johnson, 5 July 1795 ;GW to Johnson 24 August 1795.

17. GW to White, 17 May 1795; White to GW, 8 June 1795

18. a report in RG42 lists 310 perches in North Wing, 290 perches for the conference room, 300 perches for cellar, and 607 perches in South Wing. Cost of damage 475/4/0 to North Wing, 532/11/0 to South Wing; Randolph to Commrs. 10 July 1795;   Commrs to Randolph, 7 July 1795; Commrs to Randolph, 13 July 1795; for Williamson's unceasing protests see Williamson to Adams, 26 April & 9 June 1797; to GW 11 July 1796; to Jefferson 11 June 1801. Harris links Williamson dismal to Thornton's fantasy about GW's objection to Hallet's foundation in 1794. He supposes that Williamson had continued to follow Hallet's design. Thornton's fantasy and Harris's supposition have no supporting documentation; Commrs to Randolph 10 June 1795

19. Roe contract and account of slave use in Commrs. Records; In 1804 Thornton hired Roe to be the manager at his farm, Mrs.Thornton's notebook Oct 14, 1804.

20. Latrobe, Benjamin, The Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers of, 3 April 1803, p. 278.

21. see Chapter 13. 

22. Isabella Clark to Greenleaf, Morris and Nicholson, November 28, 1795.

23. Deblois to Nicholson, 14 April 1794 & 11 December 1795, Nicholson Papers.

24. Greenleaf to McComb; Greenleaf to Carroll, June 8, 1795, Carroll Papers, LC; Carroll to Greenleaf June 9, 1795, HSP. Morris to Cranch, March 6, 1796.

25. e.g. Philadelphia Gazette 10 October 1796, p. 4; Arnebeck, Fiery Trial, pp. 397, 436.

26.  Morris to Cranch 19 August 1795; Receipt in Greenleaf Papers 1 September 1795; Dermott to Cranch 22 June 1795.

27.  GW to Randolph 22 July 1795.

28. Greenleaf to Lovering, 6 July 1795, Greenleaf papers; Morris to Cranch, August 17, 1795:  Morris to Lovering, 17 August 1795;, Morris papers; Nicholson to Clark, 18 August 1795, Nicholson Papers.

29. GW to Morris 14 September 1795. 

30. Commrs to Randolph, 20 July 1795.

31. WT to GW 26 July 1795, Harris pp. 321-3.

32. WT to Commrs, 18 July 1795, Harris, pp. 320-21; agreement with Roe 1 August 1786, GW papers; 7 June 1795 notebook entries, reel 7; for Scott and slave hire see "Christmas 1794";  Samuel Davidson papers slave purchases, 6 & 16 February 1795; Arnebeck, Slave Labor in the Capitol, p. 107.

33. Lettsom to GW, 15 July 1795.

34.  GW to Commrs, 9 November 1795.

35. Brown, U. S. Capitol, plate 32.

36. Harris, LOC essay ;

37. Harris, p. 582.

38. White to GW, 17 September 1795.

39. Hadfield to Commrs, 27 & 28 October 1795









 



 

50. GW to Morris 14 September 1795.



 




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