Chapter Six Walls Fall Down

The Doctor Examined, or Why William Thornton Did Not Design the Octagon House or the Capitol

by Bob Arnebeck

 Table of Contents   

Chapter Six: Walls Fall Down

72. Robert Morris house in Philadelphia where the president lived and worked

While Thornton left Hallet stewing in his little stone house next to the Capitol, he could not avoid Hallet's pretensions once he got to Philadelphia. In mid-February, 1795, the New York Minerva, immediately followed by the Boston Orrey and Philadelphia's Gazette of the United States, printed a three part "Essay on the City of Washington." Since it was also printed in French, one scholar suggests that Hallet wrote it. However, Greenleaf had several French employees including a "Mr. Henry" who he paid to project ideas about the world capital soon to be built. Another Greenleaf brother-in-law, Noah Webster, was publisher of the Minerva. The essay primarily celebrated the economic and cultural importance of the city, and it also championed Hallet's Capitol and especially its court yard:

The capitol which is constructed on the plan drawn by Mr. Hallet, will be one of the most spacious of modern edifices.... The architecture is masculine and bold. The details are elegant and the ornaments well adjusted.... The court of this building is spacious and regular, it enlightens the interior and facilitates the communications; it will be embellished with a colonnade of the Doric order; in the center will be placed the altar of liberty, around which the United States will be represented under the figure of young women which will be closely joined together.(1)  

There remains no known reaction to the essay, let alone from Thornton, even after it was published in the fall of 1796 by the Washington Gazette. 
 
75. Essay extolling Hallet's design

But there it was for everyone to read. When Thornton met with the secretary of state on the 27th, he was not greeted as the architect of the Capitol. He simply carried an important letter from Commissioner Scott. After reading it, Randolph notified the president that "immediately after breakfast," he would bring the letter which bore "upon the subject of Mr Johnson’s letter, respecting his water-lot. If the President has not answered  it, he will perceive from the information, brought up by Dr Thornton, that something is wrong in this business." Randolph didn't mention the loan, the university or the Capitol's foundation.(2)  

Thornton wrote to Scott and confessed that he was ill. Scott immediately wrote back that he was "vexed" that Thornton was unwell at such a "critical time." He took pressure off Thornton vis-a-vis the diminutive Johnson. The commissioners would easily win "a law suit to be instituted [by] the Tom Thumb Hero of Frederick standing in Greenleaf's shoes." But he stressed Thornton about the loan. He coached Thornton on what kind of loan to negotiate and urged him to "write to me by every post."(3) 

Thornton rallied. He didn't write to his colleagues until after he had met with the attorney general and president. In that March 13 letter, he announced that it was up to himself and "the Executive" to determine the amount and terms of the loan. However, he worried that since 6% was the highest permissible interest in Maryland, "therefore it may be necessary to conclude the loan in New Jersey  (or New York) where 7 percentum are allowed..." He added that the secretary of state wanted the money as soon as possible and thought "that the interest... is no object." Then he explained that money was in short supply in Philadelphia, and a loan proposal might have to be sent to London. He had fussed with the attorney general over getting a power of attorney notarized so an agent in London could negotiate a loan: would a mayor be better than a county judge? His colleagues wrote back immediately. They tried to take control of the situation by getting documents notarized. They warned Thornton to avoid language that would make the commissioners personally liable for the loan. They also warned him not to mortgage all the remaining lots leaving them none to sell. They referred him to a letter they just sent to the secretary of state in which they asked that the president "be informed that we much fear that a mortgage of the whole remaining property of the City may lead to difficulties of a serious nature.” Thornton calmed their worries by assuring them that they were groundless. He updated them: "our expectations must rest on London. I hope we shall not be disappointed." Six months later, they were disappointed. Nonetheless, historians have hailed Thornton's Philadelphia trip as a notable accomplishment. However, Thornton was never again sent or summoned to go to Philadelphia on the board's business again. (5 & 4) 

Meanwhile, the president seemed to have no interest in the particulars of the loan. So, Thornton made the foundation his calling card. He got the impression that the president was very busy. So he decided to write a letter of generous length, 1267 words, that only discussed the foundation. In the letter, he didn't mention his reports on the basement, leveling city, and landscaping. In the Papers of William Thornton, C. M. Harris gives agency to all of Thornton's reports: "WT raised the second ["the basement"] (and likely others) in meetings with President Washington." Brief as it was, his report on the basement did in effect ask for a mandate to restore his original design. But there is no evidence that he talked to the president about his report. If the president did indeed ask him to restore his design, Thornton never revealed when or how he received that mandate.(6)

However, judging from the two letters Thornton sent to his colleagues on March 13 and 25, his March 12 meeting with the president did not amount to much. He gave his opinion about the foundation, but allowed that his colleagues differed. The president decided to reserve his opinion until he met with the whole board. Still, in his letter to his colleagues, Thornton struck a glorious chord: the president “thinks it of great importance to give the Capitol as much grandeur as possible and not to consider present considerations as much as future ones. I know we are unanimously of his opinion provided we can accommodate our present circumstances to our ideas. To effect this we must leave nothing undone with respect to the loan." Despite Thornton not specifying the grandeur he and the president discussed, his colleagues wrote back: "we are of opinion any changes in the present plan of the Capitol would be attended with consequences very fatal to the affairs of the city." The president did not write to anyone about his meeting with Thornton. There is no evidence that it was a meeting of the minds about the Capitol between a patron and his genius. In his second letter to his colleague, Thornton wrote that vis-a-vis the foundation "I do not know how he will act." On April 27, the president addressed the issue with the full board, and opted to raise the foundation six feet, four feet short of the grandeur Thornton wanted but exactly what head mason Williamson had suggested. Did the long retired surveyor who made the decision see the hill the same way the experienced castle-builder did? Then again, on April 27, the board fired the cantankerous Scot.

The letter Thornton left with the president reveals what was on his mind but he likely didn’t share much of it during his first one on one meeting with the president. In his letter, he reduced the problem with the foundation to a formula: "...the Expense is in an inverse Ratio to the increased height of the foundation." He also provided the exact cost down to the last penny for the raising foundation by 10, 9, 6, or 3 feet. Given the tenor of the endorsement of Hallet’s design recently published in the principle pro-Washington administration newspaper, it would seem more likely that Thornton would pick up the conversation about the Capitol from where it left off in July 1793: Thornton’s striking Portico verses Hallet’s confusing court yard? Instead, in his letter, he focused on the West Front. He called the East Front the "back" of the building and only complained that the foundation "was laid unnecessarily deep, which not only sank much money, but wasted time." That might seem like an argument for not raising the foundation because along the West Front the foundation stones were already exposed as they sat on the down slope of the hill. Instead, in his letter, Thornton turned that seeming mistake into opportunity. If the foundation were raised ten feet, the only digging needed was to shape the hill below: “...the Earth should slope away regularly, and when Steps are made round the semicircular part, from the Terrace, to the Park below, the whole will exhibit the magnificence of a Roman Temple." In his own mind at least, had Thornton changed his design of the Capitol, or at least grasped a new idea? His East Elevation has nary a step. In his 1793 description of his West Front, he discussed whether carriage access could be provided which a massive semicircular stairway would render impossible.

The president did not reply to Thornton’s letter, and nothing extant that he wrote about the Capitol or Thornton suggests that he read it. In his letter to his colleagues about the meeting, Thornton did go so far as to claim that both he and the president agreed “to give the Capitol as much grandeur as possible.” In his letter to the president, he expressed the same sentiment by way of ridiculing his colleagues. He chastised them for expecting rick makers to level the ground and proclaimed: "When we consider that this is a work for the Accommodation of future Ages, and the Capitol of a great and increasing people, it would be a matter of universal Condemnation: were we to sacrifice so noble a monument of Splendor, for the sake of so trivial and time-serving a Consideration." 

On March 30, the president invited Thornton for tea "this Evening 7 o'clock in a family way." If Thornton ever described his tea with the president, the description has been lost. It is possible that the president invited Thornton to tea simply to let the commissioner know he had an eye on him. In his March 25 letter to his colleagues, Thornton said he planned to leave Philadelphia shortly and the president gave him a letter to deliver to the board. Yet, Thornton lingered in the city.

He attended to personal matters. According to a note in Thornton's papers, on March 30, he bought a horse. About this time, Thornton put a down payment on a 572 1/2 acre farm six miles from Georgetown. Later that year another fellow of the American Philosophical Society congratulated him: "You are not contented with marble monuments to your name, but you will have it transmitted by the choice breed of Thornton horses, the Thornton pigs, Thornton goat, etc., etc, etc." He attended a meeting of the society and likely joined the discussion on a prospectus for a contest for the best essay on a system of liberal education. Thornton didn't return to Georgetown until April 9. The letter from the president that he delivered to his colleagues was about the lots the president had bought in Square 21. On April 10, after reading the letter, Thornton bought more lots around the corner from the president’s, this time he bought them from Greenleaf, with a down payment of $1,354.10(11)(14)

The president arrived in Georgetown on the 18th and went to Mount Vernon the next day. In the meanwhile, ex-commissioner Johnson had sued the board. Before moving on to Mount Vernon, the president tried to defuse the controversy and talked with Thornton. History has been enriched by those who have described their conversations with George Washington in detail. Thornton never did, but in his May 17 letter to Carroll, the president described his conversation with Thornton. It was all about the Johnson case:

He, any more than Mr Johnson, seemed to think this [mediation] could not be accomplished, as the Commissioners (or whether he confined it more particularly to Mr Scott and himself, I am not certain) were clearly of opinion, and had been so advised by professional men, that the lots upon Rock Creek would, undoubtedly, be considered as water lots under Greenleafs contract; and being so considered and of greater value, it followed as a consequence, that they, as trustees of public property in the City, could not yield to a claim which would establish a principle injurious to that property. He added that they had taken pains to investigate this right, and was possessed of a statement thereof which he or they (I am not sure which) wished me to look at.

76. At issue: the truncated square west of Square 4
Thornton added that he and Scott were gathering papers to be sent to Mount Vernon which would explain the situation. Indeed, on April 20, they sent the president a packet of documents and Johnson's offensive letters. In their long cover letter, they accused Johnson of "partiality, knavery and utter ignorance." The letter revealed both commissioners' passionate belief that they were right. The president wrote back that he had left their packet unopened because "having got into a course of legal adjudication, it is unnecessary for me to express any sentiment thereon. I regret that it could not be settled without, because good rarely flow[s] from disputes—evil often."(12)

It bears noting that the president did not ask Thornton and Scott who they would like for a colleague. On April 20, the president wrote to Edward Carrington and begged him to replace Commissioner Carroll because there had to be "an energetic successor." That he was a lawyer was Carrington's least qualification. He had commanded artillery during the Revolution and much more. His work as a scout and quartermaster saved the Southern army. When whiskey taxes had to be collected in Virginia, U. S. Marshal Carrington did the job. He replied on April 24 and declined the job.(13)

On April 27, the president met with the commissioners and made his decision on the foundation. That could have afforded Thornton another opportunity to discuss the Capitol design with him. There is evidence that there wasn’t any deep and meaningful discussion. On May 5, as the president rode through Georgetown on his way to Philadelphia, Hallet's son gave him a letter from his mother. In her letter, Mary Gomain Hallet described the situation at the Capitol in June 1794: "you cannot but remember that my husband’s plan has been preferred to all others, that the foundations were laid after that plan and under his direction.... I could indeed plead that his plan having been adopted, nobody can as well as he understand, its ensemble and Distributions; nobody may have the Same reasons for a careful watch over the execution even of the minutest parts.... I might represent that he must have a perfect knowledge of architecture, who could alone point out the deficiency of the rewarded plan, and Shew how much it was exceptionable in the true principles of architecture...."

In his reply, the president implied that he didn't appreciate Hallet letting his wife plead his case: "It is painful to me to receive the complaint of Mr. Hallet through you. It is more so, because I see no propriety in my interfering in the differences between the commissioners and him." Apropos Hallet's dismissal, he added: "Why Mr. Hallet left the business in which he was employed by them [the commissioners]; - or why he was discontinued, is better known, perhaps to you, than it is to me." The president asked the commissioners if he had been justly compensated. He enclosed her letter and his reply, and, if they approved, asked them to send it to her, which they did.  

Thornton did not challenge her damning his plan. He and Scott simply informed the president that "some time last winter with a full hearing in the presence of such of his friends as [Hallet] wished." The board "determined it was by no means adviseable to take him again into the public service." That was all news to the president which suggests that when Thornton met with the president on April 27, nothing was said about Hallet’s “wilful errors.” They closed their May 15 letter with good news: "We are happy in having it in our power to inform you that the Capitol progresses rapidly...." The president didn't reply to their happy report.(15) 

The next day, the president appointed Alexander White to replace Carroll. The 57 year old former two term congressman was the lawyer Stuart had suggested. Ten days later, the president found time to explain the current unhappy situation to White:

In short, the only difference I could perceive between the proceedings of the old, and the new commissioners result⟨ed⟩ from the following comparison. The old met not oftener than once a month, except on particular occasions; the new meet once or twice a week. In the interval, the old resided at their houses in the country; the new reside at their houses in George Town. The old... were obliged ⟨to⟩ trust to overseers, and superintendants to look to the execution; the new have gone more into the execution of it by contracts, and piece work, but rely equally, I fear, on others to see to the performance. These changes (tho’ for the better) by no means apply a radical cure to the evils that were complained of, nor will they justify the difference of compensation....

The letter alarmed White who replied that he knew nothing about "architecture" or managing workers. He had second thoughts about taking the job given that his law work would keep him in Virginia until October.(16) Exactly why is not known, but White soon relented and did his duty. Likely the president found a way to intimate, that his sole job would be to check Thornton and Scott. On June 10, that duo sent back letters from Johnson unopened and accused him of indecency and insanity:

We conceive it peculiarly indecent in you, having been in public Life, to offer Insults to us as Servants of the public; more especially, as decent Language was returned by us to all the disgraceful Epithets of your former Letters. We are willing to attribute the whole of your Conduct to a derangement of Mind, which we lament: and therefore consider you rather as an Object of pity than of Resentment. We return your last Letter, and refuse all further Communication, ’till a Return of Reason point out the propriety of using at least the Language of a Gentleman. 

Thornton likely wrote the attack. He was prone to use the word "lament." Johnson asked for "an Investigation of their Conduct and mine." The president understood that to mean that Johnson wanted an official public inquiry, and it took him three weeks to say no.(17) Meanwhile, in late June, three hundred feet of foundation walls for both the North and South wings fell down. That was all of that year's work. Work would resume only on the North Wing. Both houses of congress would have to meet there in 1800. The president did not lecture Thornton and Scott. He left that to Randolph who put it this way: "The President will by no means suppose, nor does he mean in the most distant manner to insinuate, that due attention was not paid by the Commissioners to the running up of the walls of the Capitol, but it may happen in some other instance that a similar fatality might take place which would be prevented by the watchful inspection of the Commissioners...." (In a letter he wrote to them a year later, the president was still blaming the commissioners.)

Thornton and Scott wrote to Randolph placing all the blame on the Irish contractor. The walls also had been under Hoban's inspection, and "one or the other of the board has frequently visited them." They also complained of how irksome it was to have anything to do with the men doing and supervising the work: "Those not acquainted with the motley set we found here and who from necessity have too many of them been continued in public employment can form no adequate idea of the irksome scenes we are too often compelled to engage in. The friend of Sir Ludovick Grant is one of the many to whom we allude." Both commissioners shared those sentiments, but Thornton likely wrote the letter. He knew Sir Ludovick Grant for whom Collen Williamson boasted of having designed and built stone castles in Scotland.(18)

Despite the strain the collapse of the walls caused between the board and the administration, everyone conspired to minimize reports of the damage. The board assigned blame so that the culprit would pay damages. For years they carried on their account book that contractor Cornelius McDermott Roe owed $1253.33 "for work at the Capitol since condemned and pulled down."

No one investigated the board's role in the collapse. Roe had a piece-work contract that the board boasted would save money and speed up the work. But there had been problems. On April 22, 1795, Roe had written to the board asking for the architect to give directions. While Roe was a contractor who hired his own masons, he did rely on the commissioners to supply him with slave laborers to move the stone. He had also complained in April and May of not having enough stone thus leaving the slaves with no work, and forcing Roe to resort to the rubble littered around the building site.(19)

Jokes were made about Roe's “continental trowel”, which is to say, the work was not worth a Continental, as worthless Revolutionary War currency was called. But, no one seems to have written a description of what remained of the aborted South Wing foundation until Latrobe did in his April 1803 report to President Jefferson on the state of the Capitol building: "Having understood that the foundation walls of the South wing... had not been faithfully executed," he had the walls "opened in several places and at different levels." He found stones "loosely thrown between between two external casings without mortar." All that had to be taken down. "Below which I am well informed that the work has been faithfully performed."(20) The work that had been faithfully performed was done before Thornton became a commissioner. The rest was done after he became a commissioner and paid a salary expressly to see that work was done properly. So much for Thornton's claim in his never sent report to the president that "it shall be my particular study to accommodate the original to the present foundation, leaving out all difficulties or parts which the most common artificer cannot execute."

As for the commissioners’ reputation, any blow caused by the fall of the walls was cushioned by the fall of Greenleaf. They could have claimed some credit. For awhile, the speculator’s luck continued. Thomas Law could back out of the deal within 18 months, but he fell in love with the federal city, as did another Nabob tagging along during one of Law’s visits. Greenleaf thought the sale to William Duncanson netted him $60,000, but his partners Morris and Nicholson rallied to get their third. Meanwhile, Law became uncomfortable with Greenleaf’s ethics in financial matters. Greenleaf never told him about the obligation to build a house on every third lot. He also left it to Law to ask the commissioners for deeds for his lots, and they said no. But Law had told the president that he would spend the rest of his life in the city. Greenleaf convinced him that relinquishing the option to back out would “give a spur to the city.” Then, on July 10, 1795, Greenleaf "sold" his share of the investment in the city to his partners Morris and Nicholson, and "bought" their shares in the North American Land Company that they had organized to market their 6 million acres of Western land. "Sold" and "bought" are in quotes because no money changed hands. In a letter to Randolph, Greenleaf took a last shot at the commissioners by accusing them of thwarting Law because he wanted to develop New Jersey Avenue southeast of the Capitol while they had an interest in Pennsylvania Avenue to the west. In a letter to Randolph, Scott and Thornton accused Greenleaf of being "a malignant slanderer."Randolph badgered Greenleaf for proof, which was the least of his problems. 

He owed $2 million to creditors who began coordinating their lawsuits to get their due. Of course, because they trusted Greenleaf’s credit in Holland to cover the notes they used to buy Western land, Morris and Nicholson were also deep in debt, but they trusted Greenleaf’s property in the city to eventually make them rich again. They kept Cranch and Lovering to manage it and build more. Cranch was Vice President John Adams’ nephew. Lovering went to Philadelphia to meet Morris and Nicholson, and they gladly sent back a builder familiar with the latest trends in London. The Nabob was very well connected in London, and they hoped to get him to either buy more lots from them or at least finance their building plans. Their scheme made sense. Law was very rich and eager to ingratiate himself into the country’ high society. In February 1796, a year after he paid Greenleaf $180.000, he proved to former commissioner Stuart, the step-father of his bride-to-be, that he was still worth $250,000 and he settled 10,000 Pounds Sterling, $40,000, on his bride Elizabeth Parke Custis, grand daughter of Martha Washington. They just needed the commissioners to cooperate by giving Law deeds.

Unfortunately for the speculators and Law, the new commissioner was not impressed with the need to cater to Law in the same way that the old commissioners catered to Greenleaf. Alexander White was a good Federalist dedicated to creating a government that protected property but, like a good Virginian, he had an innate suspicion of what passed for high finance in that day. He never reflected on his first days as a commissioner. Not giving Law title to lots that had not been paid for must have struck him as a laughably simple decision. Then White was startled by a letter to the board from his colleague Thornton. White quickly understood who he was appointed to watch and why.  

Thornton proposed cutting labor costs by buying slaves. He had previously joined his colleagues in signing an order increasing the number of laborers, mostly hired slaves, to 100. But no one had yet proposed buying slaves. He had been in the market himself. On June 17, 1795, he had bought two slaves in Georgetown who were "honest, sober and free from all bodily complaint." Judging by his wife diary and notebooks dating from 1800 to 1815, Thornton attended slave sales but he likely did not buy his slaves at an auction. Apart from his half share of the 120 to 140 Tortola slaves, he probably never owned more than a dozen at one time. However, while he would personally never free a slave and did sell some, in his proposal he was true to his reputation as a philanthropist. Positing that giving the higher wages paid to stone cutters would prevent the North Wing from being finished in time,  Thornton proposed that they hire "50 intelligent negroes for six years." By "negroes" he meant slaves. "Two or three" skilled stone cutters would teach the slaves how to cut stone. The board hired slaves by the year and no one hired them out for longer than that. Thornton solved that problem. "If the Negroes were to be purchased, to have their liberty at the expiration of 5 or 6 years, it would be perhaps still better, as no interference of the owners could then take place." His colleagues, both slave owners, were unmoved, and Thornton did not raise the issue with the president.(23)
 
White was older and had more political experience than his colleagues. He liked Thornton and his ladies and coped with Thornton by simply supporting Scott. For example, the merchant James Barry needed a ruling on where he could extend his wharf into the Eastern Branch. White and Scott advised the president to sign a regulation allowing streets to be extended to the water with the understanding that a Water Street would someday run parallel to the river. They also advised letting warehouses on wharves have only one fireplace. Thornton signified that he disagreed and the president waited to read his dissent. Thornton looked far into the future. He advised the president that completing Water Street paralleling the whole shore line was paramount. It was drawn into the plan. Most great ports had one. He pointed out places where made ground could be extended into the river to the extent of two or three city squares. He also pointed out that merchants often had their counting house in their warehouses with many rooms to accommodate clerks. They should be allowed more than one fireplace. The president wrote back to all three commissioners: "I perceive no material difference in your opinions; nor are any of them wide from mine...." Then, he let the board decide what regulations to make which, in effect, meant he agreed with White and Scott.(24)

Despite the debacle in June, the board didn't officially address the continuing work on the Capitol, and that puzzled White. Returning from a confidential trip through Virginia and Maryland to assess the reaction of the "yeomanry of the country" to the Jay Treaty with Britain, he also reported to the president that "Visiting the Works this morning an alteration of part of the Plan of the Capital agreed to by the President was brought into view...."  He gave his opinion of the change: "without a scientific knowledge of Architecture I confess the alteration proposed struck me as adding to the elegance of the Building and on conversing with Mr Hoban I find he is of the same opinion, and that it will throw the building into a more regular proportion upon the general principles of the Plan agreed to by the President than the strict execution of the Plan itself—and render further alterations unnecessary—that it will be a very great saving on the whole execution of the work, altho’ the expense of the present Wing may be somewhat augmented, but in consequence of that additional expense one hansome room will be added to it." But he was troubled by not have the president's approval: "The Board supposing they were to execute the Plans of the President and not to alter them, did not take up the business officially—but believing the matter to be of considerable consequence I was desirous that it should in some shape be brought under consideration—Doctor Thornton waits on the President for that purpose."

If Thornton went, it didn't register in the president's diary, and Thornton never mentioned it. In a November 1 letter to the president, Thornton would claim that he worked closely with Hoban to correct defects "not only in the foundation but also in some parts of the distribution of the interior." That is a rather vague way to allow that he just added a handsome room. Despite his considerable command of language, he had a penchant for being vague when he wrote about the Capitol's design. In a November 9, letter to the commissioners the president was uncharacteristically vague. He wrote that in one of his visits to the city, he was informed that "a dome over the open or circular area or lobby" was not "part of the original design of the Capitol."(26) Who else but Thornton knew about the original design? Who else but Thornton with his haphazard way of talking,  as evidenced by his defense of the board’s attacks on Johnson, could so confuse the president about the dome?

However, geniuses obviously have active minds, as do opportunists, which again raises the question: did the original designer of the Capitol want to change his design? In March 1795, Thornton had had a Roman temple on his mind. Curators at the Library of Congress suggest that Thornton could have a drawn an elevation of the West Front as early as 1795 or as late as 1800. It had the semicircular staircase rising to the colonnaded terrace outside the Conference Room. It also has a high colonnade on top of the Conference Room holding up a dome.

 

There is an undated letter in Thornton’s papers that suggests that he drew his West Front in 1795 or 1796. Thornton described a church that he had just design. The foundation had just been laid so that the design could not be built according to his design. He protested to the church’s board: “I drew the plan and elevation of the church with a circular steeple or belfrey. The principal reason was to enable you at leisure to erect a colonade round that part, which would cover the three entrances….”1 That almost describes his West Front. Although Thornton was moving out of his Georgetown house by January 1797, C. M. Harris suggests the letter was written in 1797 about a design Thornton drew in 1796. Harris also doesn’t accept 1795 as the earliest date when Thornton might have drawn his West Front. He explains that "congressional impatience with the mounting costs and slow pace of construction… steadily grew, particularly after 1795, and the design of the central block became increasingly uncertain."(27)

There is a better reason to accept the earliest date. After George Hadfield attacked Hallet’s Conference Plan in October 1795 and offered his own elevation, Thornton realized that his future fame hinged on the ideas of Dr. Thornton that Jefferson had insisted were preserved in Hallet’s remake of his original design. His hopes that Hadfield might be a “valuable acquisition” to undo Hallet’s “wilful errors” were dashed. Another revision of the plan would further dilute his contribution. Offering a new design would invite a contest between his new design and Hadfield’s. He had to defend what was in Hoban’s hand as his own plans. But he never destroyed his West Elevation. Don Hawkins made a model combining both extant fronts drawn by Thornton which clearly showed the grandeur Thornton had repeatedly urged. 

 


Toward the end of the summer, the president got a letter endorsing Thornton in the most glowing terms. It came from Lettsom who was writing to find someone interested in planting "turkey rhubarb" in America. He also offered his "sincere Thanks for the kindness shewn to a relation and Countryman of mine, whose virtues will do thy patronage no discredit. Dr Thornton to whom I allude, has a heart—an openness, a candour, and an ingenuous disposition; that, I think, are more amiably combined in his character, than in any I ever knew; and I trust, the more he is known to thee, the more thou wilt observe it."(28)

Lettsom's letter pointed out Thornton's saving graces: he amiably combined openness, candor and an ingenuous disposition. Thanks to his naivety, i.e. ingenuous disposition, Thornton had never been taken that seriously. His high colonnade was as puzzling as his scheme to buy slaves to cut stone, or his vision of clerks warming themselves by fires in warehouses built on acres of what was once river. Yet, convinced of his own genius and conviction that he was right, Thornton didn't seem to care that he was not being taken seriously. Then, Hadfield arrived and Thornton began to fight for his claim to fame. 
 

Footnotes for Chapter 6:

1. Scott, Pamela, Washington History Mag., vol. 3 no. 1, "L'Enfant's Washington Described". In Through a Fiery Trial , I credited Thomas Law for sponsoring if not writing the essay.
Gazette of the United States, February 11, 12, 13; Federal Orrery, Feb 16, 1795; Washington Gazette September 23, 26, November 19, December 7, 1796. Read on-line at www.rarenewspapers 

2. Randolph to GW, 27 February 1795;

3. Scott to WT, 4 March 1795. The published Papers of William Thornton doesn't include any of the correspondence between Thornton and Scott. 

4. WT to Commrs, 13 March 1795; Commrs. to WT 20 March 1795; Commrs. to Randolf , 20 March 1795.

5. William Allen, History of Capitol, p. 29;

6. Harris, p. 311; 

7.  Johnson to GW  28 February 1795; GW to Johnson 6 March 1795; Johnson to GW 21 March 1795; Lear to GW 8 March 1795.

8. WT to Commrs. 13 March 1795; Carroll and Scott to Thornton, 24 March 1795;

9. Jefferson wrote: "I need not repeat to you the opinions of Colo. Williams an undertaker also produced by Dr. Thornton, who on seeing the plans and hearing the objections proposed, thought some of them removeable, others not so, and on the whole that the reformed plan was the best. This past in your presence,..." Jefferson to GW 17 July 1793  

10. WT to GW 12 March 1795.

11. Allen Clark, "Doctor and Mrs. Thornton", p. 168; Ibid., p. 167; WT to Lettsom, 26 November 1795, Pettigrew 2 pp. 549-55; For horse, see Thornton Papers reel 7. Amer. Phil. Soc. Minutes; WT to Commrs. 25 March 1795; Wistar to WT Sept. 16, 1795, Harris p. 326.

12. Commrs. to GW 20 April 1795; GW to Commrs. 24 April 1795GW to Carroll, 17 May 1795;

13 GW to Carrington, 20 April 1795  & reply 

14. Commissioners proceedings;  1795 Almanac, 10 April 1795, Thornton papers, Lib. of Congress Reel 7. 

15. Mary Gomain Hallet to GW, 27 April 1795, reply 5 May 1795; GW to Commrs 5 May 1795; Commrs to GW, 15 May 1795.

16. Stuart to GW 22 February 1795,   GW to White 28 April 1795GW to White, 17 May 1795; White to GW, 8 June 1795. 

17. Carroll to GW, 15 August 1795; Williamson to GW 11 July 1796; Commrs. to Johnson, 10 June 1795; Johnson to GW, 15 June 1795; GW to Johnson, 5 July 1795 ;GW to Johnson 24 August 1795;

18. Randolph to Commrs. 10 July 1795;   Commrs to Randolph, 7 July 1795; Commrs to Randolph, 13 July 1795; Commrs to Randolph 10 June 1795

19. American State Papers Class X Miscellaneous vol. 1 p. 227; Roe contract and account of slave use in Commrs. Records; In 1804 Thornton hired Roe to be the manager at his farm, Mrs.Thornton's notebook Oct 14, 1804.

20. Latrobe, Benjamin, The Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers of, 3 April 1803, p. 278.

21. Law to Greenleaf July 1795, Clark pp. 108-9;  Commrs to Randolph, 20 July 1795.

22. Isabella Clark to Greenleaf, Morris and Nicholson, November 28, 1795Morris to Cranch, August 17 & 19, 1795:  Morris to Lovering, 17 August 1795;, Morris papers; Nicholson to Clark, 18 August 1795, Nicholson Papers.

23. WT to Commrs, 18 July 1795, Harris, pp. 320-21;  17 June 1795 notebook entries, reel 7; Samuel Davidson papers slave purchases, 6 & 16 February 1795;  Berlin, Jean V. "A Mistress and a Slave: Anna Maria Thornton and  John Arthur Bowen" Proceeding South Carolina Historical Association, 1990;

24.  Commrs. to GW 24 July 1795; WT to GW 26 July 1795, Harris pp. 321-3; GW to Commrs. 29 July 1795.

25. White to GW, 17 September 1795; Washington Federalist 27 October 1808

26. GW to Commrs, 9 November 1795. 

27. Harris, p. 582 

28. Lettsom to GW, 15 July 1795.


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