Chapter Five: Hallet Dismissed/Thornton Appointed

The Doctor Examined, or Why William Thornton Did Not Design the Octagon House or the Capitol

by Bob Arnebeck

Table of Contents 

Chapter Five: Hallet Dismissed/Thornton Appointed

57. In 1948 the White House was gutted prior to a complete renovation. The building is about the size of the North Wing of the Old Capitol. This photo gives an idea of the shallow sandstone foundation of both building (be sure to click photo to enlarge it.)

58. Renovation of the White House in 1949 revealed the rough-hewn foundation of the 1790's where designs gave way to the reality of  shovels, mallets and chisels.

It's not certain when Thornton arrived, but once in Georgetown, he had much gossip to digest. Despite the foundation stones of the Capitol only peaking here and there above ground, the commissioners fired Hallet for insubordination. That was good news for Thornton. On July 3, 1794, when the president rode through Georgetown on his way back to Philadelphia, he asked the board's treasurer, William Deakins, to make inquiries about a Baltimore lawyer named Gustavus Scott who now and then came to Georgetown to attend to Potomac Company business.(1) That was bad news. If the president replaced Johnson, also from Maryland, with the Baltimore lawyer, then to keep the board balanced, the president had to appoint someone from Virginia to replace Stuart. By July 6, likely not by coincidence, Thornton found someone from Virginia to write a letter to the president to counter that. 

The president's godson, Ferdinando Fairfax, posted a  letter extolling Thornton who "even with the sacrifice of considerable pecuniary interest, being desirous of fixing himself in the neighborhood of the city of Washington, wou’d willingly accept of some appointment in w’ch his talents might contribute to the Public Advantage by advancing the growth or Prosperity of the City.” Fairfax, then 28 years old, was a scion of a family that was the closest to royalty that Virginia had, and was highly respected by George Washington. Lord Fairfax had given him one of his first surveying jobs. Like Thornton, Ferdinando was high minded in his pursuits. In 1790, he had written a magazine article urging that freed slaves be sent to Africa.

Thornton obviously coached Fairfax on what to write: "From a pretty good acquaintance with him, as well as from general repute, I believe him to possess uncommon Talents, and to have cultivated particularly those Branches of Science which are most useful in this business—and, what is of equal or perhaps more consequence, to have a large share of Public Spirit, and great integrity. He has a Plan of a National University, which appears to deserve attention, and w’ch, at some convenient time, he is desirous of submitting to your Consideration." There is no evidence that at that time Thornton had a plan for a National University. Blodget had renewed the president's interest in that by suggesting a site for it in the federal city. Thornton likely got wind of the idea and the president's interest in it from Blodget. Fairfax didn't mention the Capitol or Hallet. After three others men refused appointment, on September 12, the president appointed Thornton to replace Commissioner Stuart.(2)

Much has been made of his appointment being made just after the board fired Hallet for insubordination. Thornton himself first described a dramatic scene that preceded his appointment. In June 1806, he wrote in a letter to Secretary of State James Madison that "When General Washington saw the foundation of the Capitol laid by Mr: Hallet which tended to make the middle part square, to the exclusion of the centre Dome he was so affected by the presumption of making so unauthorized an Alteration that he in a passion directed him to quit the place, and the Commissrs: discharged him." In 1896, Glenn Brown picked up the story and suggested that Hallet’s subverting the winning design: 

"was probably one of the reasons why President Washington appointed Thornton one of the commissioners. The commissioners had full power over the Federal buildings, and as Thornton held this position until 1802, he was able to prevent further tampering with his design for that length of time.... When Thornton was appointed commissioner, Washington requested him to see that everything was rectified so that the building would conform to the original plan." 

In 1995, C. M. Harris filled in the blanks. Who told the president what was afoot: "It became clear, however, after Thornton and his friend J. J. U. Rivardi had visited the site that President Washington had not endorsed this solution, which eliminated the grand vestibule and the great repository of Thornton's premiated design." In his History of the United States Capitol: A Chronicle of Design, Construction, and Politics, William Allen lends credence to Harris's take. The commissioners "could see that [Hallet's] foundations did not provide for the great round vestibule, or rotunda, that was Washington’s favorite part of the design."(4)

However, all that amounts to is a good story for which is there is absolutely no evidence. George Washington did not waste two months to appoint his fourth choice in order to save his favorite part of the Capitol design. In 1794, nobody suggested that the dome was in jeopardy. In all that the commissioners and president wrote prior to and for two years after the July 1793 meeting, there was no mention of the "great round vestibule." In 1806, Thornton claimed that the 1794 dispute was about the "centre dome" because  he was trying to get rid of Benjamin Latrobe by falsely accusing him of laying the foundation of the South Wing so the dome could not be built. Thornton could not fathom how a circular room could possibly be built on a square foundation. Latrobe doubted that a circular foundation could provide enough stability to support a large chamber topped by a dome. Judging from a November 1795 letter to commissioners Carroll, Scott and Thornton, the president seemed to understand that. He wrote that a dome could be "over the open or circular area or lobby." That gives the impression that he understood that a dome could cover the "open" area, that is Hallet's square, or "circular area,” Thornton's grand vestibule or Hallet’s Conference Room.(5)

Hallet found laying the Capitol's foundation problematical. In a January 1795 letter to the board, he recalled the difficulties he faced in May 1794: "I traced and directed the laying of the foundation of the Capitol, a work of such extent and importance as to require in every point of view the greatest attention and the more so because it could only be done in detached squares and had the unevenness of the ground to contend with." The site was not level. It sloped down from east to west. Evidently, the crew of Irishmen that dug out the ground for the foundation made a relatively shallow incision into the hill. Hallet floated the idea to the board of digging out more ground on the east side of the building to accommodate cellars under the "detached squares." The board frowned on more digging and wondered if he might just "sink the Walls and not dig out the Area."(6) Then Collen Williamson, the Scottish master mason who had managed to get the foundation of the President's house laid without any problems, entered the discussion. He pointed out that while Hallet had given masons orders, he had never shown anyone his plans for the foundation. Williamson accused Hallet of hiding the changes he made to the plan approved by the president. On June 7, the board authorized Williamson to get Hallet's plans, which they described as "several drafts and essays of drafts of the various parts of the Capitol on distinct sheets or pieces of paper numbered from 1 to 15."(7)

Why the board turned on Hallet is easily explained. Greater reliance on Hallet might require that he be paid a salary commensurate with what Williamson and Hoban were getting which meant Hallet would get a $1,000 raise. Hallet refused to give up his plans. That is also easily explained. Once the board had his plans, they could hand them to Williamson or Hoban and fire Hallet.

The president had been expected at their June 7 meeting but not to discuss the Capitol. At the September 1793 auction of lots, the president had bought six lots on the Eastern Branch. To correct any impression that he was favoring one side of the city, he immediately took Blodget aside and bought some lots in Square 21 on Peter's Hill close to the mouth of Rock Creek. He thought of building his private residence there. Greenleaf had offered to buy his Western lands which would finance the project. By the following spring, he decided to buy the whole square which would require the help of the commissioners. But congress remained in session, and that kept the president in Philadelphia. The board scheduled their next meeting for June 20 when the president would be able to attend. 

The president arrived in Georgetown on the 20th, but the commissioners didn't. The road from Bladensburg to Georgetown passed over a mile north of the Capitol. If he inspected Hallet's work on the 21st, he never mentioned it nor did Hallet or anyone else. On Sunday, June 22nd, he rode out to see the locks around the Virginia side of Little Falls. The Capitol did not have to be ready until 1800, but the Potomac River locks were supposed to be inviting the commerce of the world in 1794. On his way, his horse stumbled; to prevent a fall the president wrenched his back and just managed to make it to Mount Vernon. When the board met, he was still convalescing. He wrote to Commissioner Johnson on the 27th and regretted that he did not see him in the federal city.(8)

On the 23rd, Hallet reacted to board's attempt to get his drawings. He insisted he would give them up only after they hired him as the superintending architect and paying him what they paid Hoban. They also had to credit him as the only designer of the Capitol. The commissioner replied on the 26th: “nothing has ever gone from us by which we intended or we believe you could infer that you had the chief direction of executing the work of the Capitol or that you or anybody else were to introduce into that building any departures from Doctr Thornton’s Plan without the Presidents or commissioners approbation.” They only had to re-read the letter the president sent on July 25, 1793, to see that the president had told them to have Hoban supervise laying the foundation. Both Hoban and Hallet had told the commissioners they understood the president's instructions. In their letter to Hallet, the commissioners rather rubbed that in: "Mr. Hoban was employed here before our acquaintance began with you more especially as chief over the President's house, of which he was fortunate enough to produce a plan which meet with general we may almost say with universal approbation and to extend his Superintendence to any other building we may require."   

Hallet replied to the board on June 28 and insisted that the July conference had led to the adoption of his plan: “In the alteration I never thought of introducing in it any thing belonging to Dr Thornton’s exhibitions. So I Claim the Genuine Invention of the Plan now executing and beg leave to Lay hereafter before you and the President the proofs of my right to it...." The board only wanted his plans and would not suffer lectures nor involve the president. The board fired Hallet on the 28th and asked a lawyer to file a suit to force Hallet to give them his drawings. The board had faced insubordination before with L'Enfant, and this time they acted decisively. Because the plan itself was not at issue, it was their decision not the president's.(9)

Because he was recovering from a wrenched back, the president didn't see the foundation before the commissioners fired Hallet. As for Thornton and Rivardi seeing the foundation before the president, there is no evidence for that either. Thornton never wrote anything about his December trip to the city let alone seeing Hallet's foundation. There was likely not enough to see. Williamson could not raise an alarm about it it until late May. As for Rivardi, the War Department recruited him to fortify the ports of Norfolk and Baltimore. While hurrying between them, he set up a battery of guns in Alexandria. Writing from Norfolk on May 6, 1794, he advised the president about defensive works there as well as in Baltimore. In his letter, he didn't mention Thornton, the Capitol or the commissioners . It is very doubtful that Major Rivardi had time to look at Hallet's foundations. Wasting valuable time to do that might have been considered a dereliction of duty.(10)

On July 10, in the first letter the commissioners wrote to the president after their dispute with Hallet, they only wrote about their meeting with Greenleaf. They mortgaged a thousand lots so he could raise a million dollar loan in Holland to finance construction of the public buildings. The crisis of the moment in theirs and Greenleaf's minds was drainage: "We have had Intercourse with Mr Greenleaf about Drains, and expect he will have a conversation with you on the subject—None can be more strongly impressed than we are of the propriety and importance of entering on this Business early, and on a large Scale...." There was no mention of Hallet, the Capitol's foundation or the grand vestibule, even though Greenleaf was distressed that Hallet had been dismissed. But the rich speculator solved the problem. He offered to pay Hallet so he could continue to make drawings necessary for the completion of the Capitol. The commissioners tentatively agreed on condition that Hallet not give any instructions to the masons. That the commissioners agreed to that and continued to let Hallet rent one of their houses next to the Capitol, suggests they realized that Hallet was not sabotaging the design sent down from Philadelphia in July 1793. However, as much as he was amenable to all of Greenleaf's ideas, keeping Hallet gnawed on Commissioner Johnson. He wrote to his brother who was the US Consul in London and asked him to send over a British architect who could get the job done.(11)

Of course, Thornton was in Georgetown in July. Evidently, Johnson and Greenleaf didn’t think that he could be the solution to their Hallet problem. Also in July, two English-born architects that Greenleaf had hired came to work in the city. The president and Johnson knew one of them. In 1790, Joseph Clark took time off from building his dome for the Maryland State House, to give a plan for the federal city to the president. In 1792, he had expected all the amateurs in the design contest not to please, leaving him to design and build the Capitol. Likely, Greenleaf didn’t even think of volunteering Clark to save the Capitol. In early May, he had contracted to pay Clark and William Lovering an unheard of 8% commission for at least $30,000 worth of building annually for the next seven years. Unfortunately for the architects' future fame, Greenleaf put them to work building row houses over a mile from the Capitol on N and P Streets SW in what everyone began calling Greenleaf's Point. By virtue of overlooking the confluence of the Potomac and Eastern Branch and the yet to be built Washington Canal, it was expected to be but never became a commercial center of world wide importance.(12) 

However, what was built there proved to be important in the history of the Capitol. Thornton's future fame entailed more than designing the Capitol. That he designed the Octagon, a mansion still standing just southwest of the White House, was offered as proof to doubters that he was indeed a great architect. Lovering was the superintending architect which entailed organizing and overseeing the various contractors who would build the house. At that time, it was common for the architect who designed a building to also superintend its construction. James Hoban was the perfect example. He designed and built the President's house. Since evidence that Thornton designed the Octagon relied heavily on a proud family's say so long after the principals died, it behooved architectural historians to find evidence that Lovering could not have designed it.(13) 

The first large brick house built on the Point still stands in a cul de sac at the west end of N Street SW. Its site was originally the northeast corner 6th Street and N Streets. In the late 20th century, Lovering would be credited for designing it. Architectural historians point to the humdrum design of the N Street house as proof that he could not have designed the Octagon. That left Thornton as the likely genius who did design it. C. M. Harris observed that the N Street house was "well executed but, in terms of design, conventional and unadventurous." In Building the Octagon, Orlando Ridout V cites the house as proof that Lovering did not have the imagination to design the Octagon. But Lovering did not design the house on N Street.(14)

Greenleaf hired his brother-in-law Dr. Nathaniel Appleton to be his chief clerk. He arrived in late June and moved into the large brick house. He also sent reports that made clear that neither Lovering or Clark had yet arrived on the Point. James Simmons, the young Philadelphia coach maker that Greenleaf hired in November 1792, had been there at least since April 17. He brought workers and building materials. He had two months to build a spacious headquarters to house his family and Appleton. The latter did not recall dates and circumstances years later. He died back in Boston in April 1795. Before his terminal illness bought him home to die, he had to move from the N Street house and find refuge in a house in Georgetown perched high above the river. He advised his replacement, another brother-in-law, that houses on 6th Street flanking the Potomac were "the most ineligible in that climate, as you'll perceive in June, July and August next."(15) 

In the contracts Lovering and Clark signed there was no mention of designing a stand alone three story brick house. The row houses they built were patterned on London townhouses. An advertisement for the sale of one house Lovering built described it as having “two convenient kitchens, two parlors and six lodging chambers – a brick pavement in front, and the yard and area are paved with brick.” Plus, it had a coach house and stables. Lovering’s houses could be distinguished from Clark’s. Appleton determined that Lovering's houses cost $4.50 a square foot to build and Clark's cost $5.50. That likely reflects their different designs not the skill of their workers. Clark brought a crew of workers from Annapolis and Baltimore. Lovering, “late from London” and with his second wife and their baby girl, had to start from scratch. He signed his contract with Greenleaf in Philadelphia on May 8. On May 20, he advertised for skilled men and laborers to go to the City of Washington to work "from six to six with two hours for refreshment." Eventually, Lovering assumed control of finishing the house, incorporating building materials that arrived from New England that included "marble slate and chimney pieces, mahogany twist handrails, and stone circular arches."(16)

The Simmons house loomed large in the story of Thornton’s rise for another reason. Along with Greenleaf’s ambitious building plans which spread throughout the city, the largest house in the city inspired the president to decide that the time had come for the gentlemen in charge of the city to live in the city. The late July letter inviting the senator from Maryland to join the board is extant. He was looking for a federal job closer to his home. The president explained how he wanted to retool the board. The commissioners would fill the role outlined for Blodget, the since fired superintendent, and would be paid a $1,600 salary instead of merely a per diem and travel expenses. He also wanted the commissioners to "reside within the City, or so near to it, as by a daily attendance to see that everything moves with regularity, economy and dispatch...." He described the evils that arose from monthly meetings that kept the commissioners from answering "all the purposes of their appointment... that by being always on the spot, they are at hand to embrace offers, and to avail themselves of opportunities that frequently present, but will not wait, not only to purchase materials and to engage artisans, but to interest foreigners and strangers who may view the city, in the purchase of lots, but who, otherwise know not where to apply...." The president concluded that "the nonresidence of the commissioners has, I am persuaded, been attended with many disadvantages, and has been the source of those unpleasant disputes between them and the proprietors, the Superintendants, their Workmen, & c. & c."(17)

 

It was not an enticing letter and the senator as well as Maryland’s governor, whose term was about to end, declined the appointment. Then he offered the job to the Maryland lawyer he had vetted in July, and Gustavus Scott accepted. Their correspondence is not extant but evidently the president concluded that the residency requirement in a yet to be built city was the major sticking point. On August 28, he offered the job to his fourth choice, Tobias Lear, and he made moving easier: "It has been found from experience, indispensibly necessary that the Commissioners should reside in the City (in George Town would be tantamount)...” The president also made the duties of Stuart’s replacement less exacting. He explained that Scott would decide points of law “depending thereon as for the draughting of agreements & other instruments which are requisite in the progress of the business." Then, suspecting that Lear would not accept appointment, he asked what the “proprietors” thought of Thornton and revealed what little he knew about him: “The Doctr is sensible, and indefatigable I am told, in the execution of whatever he engages; To which may be added his taste for architecture; but being little known, doubts arise on that head.” 

Lear declined and reported that Thornton was "much esteemed by those of the proprietors and others hereabouts from whom I have been in the way of drawing an opinion; they consider him as a very sensible, genteel and well informed Man, ardent in his pursuits; but liable to strong prejudices, and such I understand is his prejudice against Hoben that I conceive it would hardly be possible for them to agree on any points where each might consider himself as a judge—Weight of Character, from not being known, seems also to be wanting." Lear mentioned four others that he had heard others suggest for the job, but the president had to crush a rebellion in Western Pennsylvania; Thornton was in Philadelphia, could be quickly notified. On September 12, Edmund Randolph, who replaced Jefferson as secretary of state, informed Thornton that he had been appointed a commissioner to replace Commissioner Stuart with a salary of $1,600, and with the understanding that he eventually live in the City of Washington. Since both the president and Thornton were in the Philadelphia, is it likely that they met to discuss his appointment? The president got Lear's letter no earlier than September 7. He was in Germantown, which was a safe distance from any recurrence of yellow fever. Once appointed, Thornton promptly left for Georgetown. He got back to Philadelphia perhaps a week before the president left on September 30 with an army to subdue the insurgents.(3)(19)

The newly appointed commissioner did not need a personal word from the president to alert him to the problems faced by the commissioners or confirm the importance of his appointment. The departure of Johnson and Stuart was applauded in the federal city and Georgetown and there was no doubt that their replacements would make everything better, primarily because they they would be required to live in the city, a requirement widely known.(20) The design of the Capitol was a source of anxiety only for Thornton and Hallet. The universal problems were the vexing distances created by the city plan and lack of housing. Masons balked at having to walk up Capitol Hill to get to work. Carpenters joked about the city regulation requiring that any house made of wood be removed by 1800. Proprietors and speculators puzzled over the relative importance of various streets and avenues, which would sooner be viable and which would be completely obscured by second growth scrub and virulent berry bushes. Having commissioners always on the scene might allow them to adapt the plan to the reality of the topography and needs of the individual proprietors, workers, and shop keepers, not to mention those seduced by the commissioners or speculators to actually make the federal city their permanent home. 

However, Scott, who had a large family, couldn’t find a house and evidently commuted from a farm he had in Virginia. Thornton bought two lots in Square 33 on Peter's Hill around the corner from where the president had bought lots. One of Thornton's lots had a large frame building on it, but he would never live there. The city's few houses were spread throughout the largely vacant city. There were no clusters of houses save where men who worked on public buildings lived. They were not genteel. Thornton took the “tantamount” option, soon bought a house in Georgetown across the street from the bank and Union Tavern. His wife who grew up in Philadelphia felt quite at home and in a year her mother would sell her house in Philadelphia and stay with them for the rest of her life. She outlived Thornton by 7 years.(21)  

On September 15, 1794, the new board met in Georgetown. Thornton did not have his official notice of appointment and could only watch the remaining original commissioner Daniel Carroll of Rock Creek and Scott, the lawyer who also had previous experience in public office including as a state legislator and member of the Baltimore health committee where there was a yellow fever epidemic in 1794. Despite the latter's credentials, in 1896, after a cursory examination of the board's records, Glenn Brown credited Thornton for doing what Scott had been trained to do: "After Thornton became a member of the board of commissioners, a decided improvement is evident in their written proceedings and in the business forms and contracts which were introduced in connection with the streets, bridges and buildings that were in their charge. As they appear in the records after his appointment, Thornton should have the credit for the improvement." After working with Scott on the board's affairs, Deakins would complement him as "well Calculated for making Contracts & seems to have a perfect Knowledge of the Value of Work & Materials." Thornton's heart likely sank as he saw how Scott took command of the board.(22)

Of course, that prompted Thornton to make his mark. On September 19, Commissioners Carroll and Scott sent a letter to Secretary of State Randolph discussing their cautious response to Greenleaf's new proposals for paying what he owed the commissioners. They assured Randolph that once back in Philadelphia, Thornton "will very readily give any further information if wished for." The phrase "very readily" suggests that his colleagues' first impression of Thornton was that he quickly grasped a problem and then couldn't stop talking about it. It also suggests that they did not view Thornton as a rival and looked forward to working with him. Yet, two weeks after learning the commissioners' case, Thornton seemed to plead Greenleaf's. 

In Philadelphia, Thornton briefed the secretary of state in a way that puzzled him. On October 2nd, Randolph wrote to the commissioners that "Dr. Thornton, a member of your board, and Mr. Greenleaf called upon me this morning...." Greenleaf wanted to change his way of paying the commissioners $50,000 on May 1, 1795. It is possible that Thornton looked up Greenleaf in Philadelphia, but it is more likely that the speculator immediately began working to make Thornton as amenable to his ideas as the commissioner he replaced.(23)

When he returned from Philadelphia, Thornton found that Scott had taken over leadership of the board. He began reviewing the  contracts the old board made with the speculators. Thornton soon understood that associating himself with Greenleaf's ideas about paying his installment was not appreciated by his colleagues. As for the Capitol, on October 1, while Thornton was in Philadelphia, Scott and Carroll formalized Greenleaf's agreement to pay Hallet to support his continued work on the Capitol design. That his colleagues made the decision before he returned suggests that they did not think Thornton was appointed by the president to oversee all that pertained to that Capitol. That Thornton did not object to continued support for Hallet suggests that Thornton had no special briefing from the president about the Capitol. That the board used James Simmons, who paid Hallet with Greenleaf’s money, to try to get information from Hallet suggests that Thornton felt that he was no longer a part of the design process. The board thought it got Hallet to agree to give them "the sections and what relates to the first or basement story of the Capitol." What he sent didn't satisfy them, but their November 25 letter to Simmons didn't particularize their dissatisfaction.(24) Obviously, Thornton did not have any concrete plans for changes to the Capitol design.

Meanwhile, in response to his brother's plea, Joshua Johnson, the consul in London, asked John Trumbull, who had just returned to London with a diplomatic mission, to recommend a British architect. The artist knew just the young man for the job. Trumbull sent a letter to his brother Jonathan in Connecticut extolling George Hadfield's bona fides which included eight years studying architecture at the Royal Academy in London and Rome. Trumbull's brother passed the letter on to the president who sent it down to the commissioners without saying the young man had to be hired. 

John Trumbull also wrote to Tobias Lear who pressed the matter with Commissioner Scott, who was not encouraging, and with Thornton who offered some hope. According to Lear, Thornton explained that the board "conceived that the Gentleman whom Mr Trumbull mentions would be a valuable acquisition to the City; but as the great public buildings are now going on upon approved plans, it was a doubt whether there would be immediately such employment for Mr Hatfield’s talents as could justify them in offering what might be considered as an inducement for him to come over: However, as other public buildings, such as an University and its appendages, Churches &c. &c. would presently be wanting, he could, in these, have an opportunity of originating and superintending, which might make it worth his while to come over; and that they should give the matter a further consideration as soon as they could get through some other business which pressed and demanded their immediate attention, and would then decide upon it." On December 18, the board wrote a discouraging letter to Trumbull and so informed the president. Both letters were short and to the point. In the letter to the president, they added, "we embrace this occasion to say that it is our intention to send for your information a statement of the business of the City as far as may be in our power, and Materials for that purpose can be collected together."(25)

Evidently, in regards to the Capitol, their power was limited. Hoban provided “an Account of the expences incurred to the 1st of January 1795 on the Presidents House & also what will be incurred at the present prices of Materials & Labor to carry that building to the roof. Also an Estimate of the Materials for finishing it."They had no figures on the Capitol to match that.  The board decided to hire Hadfield. Thornton likely wrote to the board’s January 2 letter to the president explaining why: "We view, and review the magnitude of our Undertaking; which, requiring all our Attention, leaves less time to individual Exertion in the Superintendance of the public Buildings, and we are convinced of the necessity of constant attention to adjust the various Members of the Work, to preserve an elegant Correspondence—A Superintendant of great ability, whose time will be wholly engaged is therefore requisite;"

On January 6, in the same packet of letters sent to Trumbull with the board’s offer to Hadfield, Thornton was more direct in explaining how he hoped to benefit by hiring Hadfield. He wrote to Trumbull that he was "pleased" that his appointment as a commissioner "will afford me an opportunity of correcting some wilful errors which have been fallen into by those jealous men who objected to my plan, because I was not regularly brought up an architect.” He implied that Hadfield might be an unwitting instrument to exact his revenge. Thornton had told Lear that the "approved plan" did not require Hadfield's assistance. In his letter to Trumbull, the approved plan became "the general plan." In his letter to Trumbull, the approved plan became "the general plan." He asked Trumbull "to represent to Mr. Hadfield that the general plan is adopted, but there may be particular parts that will require minute attention, and I shall be always happy in consulting the taste of Mr. Hadfield. I have much pleasure in expectation, for he will be a pleasing acquisition to me.” Trumbull got the point. He warned Hadfield "to avoid any circumstances that may thwart their [the commissioners'] views or give them offence." He also intimated that except for L'Enfant, no one in America would "be your equal in knowledge in your profession."(27)

A few days after the board sent their letter to Hadfield, Commissioner Carroll received a letter from the president that marked a change in his attitude to the commissioners both old and new. Because of the French invasion of Holland, the agent Greenleaf sent to prepare the way for the consummation of Greenleaf’s American real estate speculations reported that credit was tight and raising money was unlikely. Greenleaf stayed in America and in December persuaded Thomas Law, a Nabob, as Englishmen who got rich in India were called, to buy 500 of the speculators' federal city lots for $180,000. That is, Law paid $360 a lot that Greenleaf had contracted to buy for $80. The president was dumbfounded. On January 7, he wrote to Commissioner Carroll who had signed the contract with Greenleaf. In December the speculator had persuaded Thomas Law, a Nabob, as Englishmen who got rich in India were called, to buy 500 of the speculators' federal city lots for $180,000. That is, Law paid $360 a lot that Greenleaf had contracted to buy for $80. The president was not amused. He wrote to Commissioner Carroll who had signed the contract with Greenleaf and asked why the commissioners sold lots to Greenleaf so cheaply. Then he broadened his critique and asked why the board didn't make such a sale given that their receiving a salary was to prod them to do just that. In reply, Carroll pointed out that the contract the old board made with Greenleaf had a clause regulating any large sales to speculators, and Law would have to build 166 houses in the next four years.(28) Unmentioned in the president's or Carroll's letter was that despite the considerable sum he just made, Greenleaf didn't shower any of that money on the federal city. Neither workers, architects nor commissioners would get a penny. 

An upshot of Greenleaf’s spending his profits elsewhere was that on January 21, Hallet asked to be rehired. It took the commissioners a month to respond. Meanwhile, as they promised the president, the board pulled together reports on their future expenses, which, with a very long cover letter, they sent to the president on February 4. They had some explaining to do: "The Paper marked B will give some Idea of the expenditure already made on the Capitol. What ultimately it may cost we cannot at present exactly calculate." Judging by the phrasing of sentences in the February letter, Scott and Thornton both felt obliged to address the paucity of information about the Capitol. Scott added: "But we beg leave to Suggest the Idea whether it would not be prudent in the present State of our funds to forego carrying on more of that building than the immediate accommodation of Congress may require. It is conceived that this may be done without at all affecting the completion of the whole at a future day on the plan approved." And to that Thornton added: "The Conduct of Mr Hallet whose capricious and obstinate refusal to deliver up such Sections of the Capitol as were Wanting obliged the late Commissioners to discharge him, and occasioned some difficulties in this business."

Of course, the board didn’t mention that Hallet wanted his job back. The president might order it. The board tried to simply their problems by taking advantage of Greenleaf’s fall from grace. Scott even calculated that what money the speculator might manage to pay would just cover the amount due to proprietors for the purchase of all the land the government needed. To support their operations,  the board suggested getting a $500,000 loan by offering to up to mortgage 4,000 lots. That round sum was what Blodget aimed for with his aborted 1792 loan. On February 12, Secretary of State Randolph replied to the February 4 letter by inviting one of the board to come to Philadelphia to do the paperwork required for getting a loan from a bank. The board decided to send Thornton. Glenn Brown and others cite that as proof that Thornton was the leading commissioner. Actually, Commissioner Carroll, the former congressman and a member of the richest family in Maryland if not the nation, expected to go there and arrange the loan. Then the debility from the illness that would prove terminal made that impossible. Lawyer Scott was the obvious replacement but Randolph was also a lawyer. Also, congress was not in session and a skilled lobbyist was not needed. The board decided that the personable Thornton, who had briefly lived in Philadelphia, could do what needed to be done. Plus, he might smooth over a recent gaff better that Scott.

On January 28, the president sent the commissioners a letter that urged that planning begin for a National University in the federal city. Once a plan was adopted, he would donate 50 shares of Potomac Company stock to endow the institution. However, "as the design of this University has assumed no form with which I am acquainted; and as I am equally ignorant who the persons are that have taken, or are disposed to take, the maturation of the plan upon themselves, I have been at a loss to whom I should make this communication of my intentions."

In a somewhat depressed letter to Lettsom written earlier in January, Thornton had highlighted one bright prospect, establishing a university "which on mentioning my ideas to the President he approved of much. He even desired me to write and digest a plan." Evidently, the president didn't remember that conversation. Thornton wrote the commissioners' reply to the president which ended by hailing Thornton for what he had not done: "Many have suggested in part what ought to be done in forming a general plan. None has yet been presented, but the Board was informed, some time ago, that Dr Thornton has long had it in Contemplation to lay such an one before the Executive, and has made some progress in digesting it."(31)

In his own mind, Thornton could excuse his only making some progress because, in his own mind, he had been digesting plans to solve more pressing problems. The old board had hired a French engineer who offered to come up with a plan to level the city so that drainage ditches were arranged rationally. "Monsr. Blois" began the first step in the process by charting the altitude of points throughout the city. Building on that, Thornton drafted a report on leveling for the president that announced that "it appears necessary to lay the plan I propose before the Executive that a certain rule may be adopted by which all future operations shall be regulated." However, he evidently didn’t share his ideas with his colleagues. Just before he died in the summer of 1796, Commissioner Carroll wrote down his many thoughts on leveling. He didn’t mention Thornton let alone his “certain rule.” As for landscaping, Thornton allowed that his plan would have made more sense if adopted before so many trees had been cut down to clear the way for streets and avenues.
    Monsr. Blois had paid particular attention to the uneven ground on Capitol Hill, and that, rather than his January 6 pledge to correct Hallet’s “wilful errors” encouraged Thornton’s to dissent from his colleagues’ use of Blois’s data. The president had not allowed putting the Capitol higher on the hill which necessitated a decision on scheduling the removal of the enough ground around and behind the foundation already laid to level the site. Scott and Carroll thought Blois’s data justified trusting brick makers to level the hill while work began on the Capitol’s next story. After all, the foundation was 10 feet high with walls almost as thick and had cost $60,000. Thornton came up with a different idea: raise the height of the foundation by ten feet so that its western edge which would support the Conference Room was level with the height of the crest of the hill. To gain a scientific understanding of the problem, the doctor followed in Blois's footsteps. As he would put it in a letter to the president: "Being cautious of admitting any Information on this important Subject, without investigating the minutiæ myself, I went over the Ground with a very accurate Instrument, and took the different heights, which I found corresponded so nearly to the Elevations given by Monsr Blois, that I may, with great propriety proceed upon his Reports as Data, in calculating the difference of the Expence of raising the foundation and of removing the Ground.” He then concluded that raising the foundation was cheaper than removing the ground. That didn’t impress his colleagues. They expected brick maker to dig and remove clay at no cost to the commissioners. 

Thornton’s calculations had nothing to do with the dispute over the East Front portico. In his report, Thornton merely faulted Hallet for sinking the foundation there too deep. However, Thornton also wrote a report on the basement that would be built on top of the foundation. He began boldly: "I must beg leave to remark that very great liberties have been taken in laying out the foundation of the Capitol, and unnecessary deviations made from the plan you were pleased to approve." He couldn't specify the liberties taken because he didn’t know Hallet’s plans: "It has been hinted that this part of the building was to be left out. I cannot tell what was contemplated by those who immediately superintended the building, but this may be observed, that no large building, in order, can be produced as an example for leaving out the basement." But, he could only make a bold promise: "It shall be my particular study to accommodate the original [plan]to the present foundation leaving out all difficulties or parts which the most common artificer cannot execute."(30)

The hint may have come from a letter that head mason Williamson had sent to the board in late December in which he claimed he had never heard that the Capitol was to have a basement. He welcomed the idea and suggested what in effect would have been a sub-basement six feet high to level the site. However, since 1792 Williamson had urged that bricks not be used because no castle in Scotland had them. Hence, Scott and Carroll grew deaf to his advice. While Thornton had to fear that Williamson had seen a basement-less Hallet elevation, he also had to be taken aback by the too opinionated old man offering design changes. There was a way to find out Hallet’s intentions. But, a month after Hallet’s request to be rehired, the board’s secretary inform him that "the Board have concluded previous to giving an answer to your request you will lay before them any papers you have respecting the Capitol.”(29) The next day, Thornton left for Philadelphia.

As it turned out he didn’t hand the president his report on basement, nor on landscaping and leveling. He evidently had not discussed his ideas with his colleagues. However, they had discussed the foundation and he intimated that, if asked, he would share his ideas with the president. Then as he left, Scott gave him a letter to hand to Randolph that scotched Thornton’s hopes of shining. Scott's earlier efforts to win appointment to the federal bench had been stymied by a rumor that he was disloyal during the revolution. The lawyer he replaced on the board, Thomas Johnson, had been Maryland's governor during the Revolution. Commissioner Scott found a way to exact revenge. A paragraph in the long report the board had sent to the president disputed the right of Johnson to buy lots from Greenleaf along Rock Creek just north of the stone bridge at K Street NW. It claimed that Greenleaf had no right to pick water lots which were obviously worth more than $80. Thornton agreed with Scott but didn't calculate what impression might be made by the three page letter. Thanks to a letter from Johnson, the president already had a bad impression of the business. A few days later, a letter from ex-commissioner Stuart warned that "the Commissioners are in my opinion in an error; and have acted with too much precipitation." Also, since Commissioner Carroll had just submitted his resignation effective once the president picked a replacement, who, Stuart advised the president, should be "a ⟨Law⟩ character of considerable eminence." Left unsaid but clearly implied was that Scott and Thornton had to be checked.(32)

Chapter Six

Footnotes for Chapter Five

1. Deakins to GW 7 July 1794;

2.  Fairfax to GW, 6 July 1794  ; Fairfax, Ferdinando, "Plan for liberating the negroes within in the united states." American Museum December 1790, pp. 284-86; On Blodget's plans for National University see Commrs. to GW 24 June 1793; mentions of Thornton's appointment are in GW to Stuart 21 September 1794 and Randolph to Scott 4 October 1794 which is quoted in a footnote to Randolph to GW 6 October 1794. In both letters Thornton's appointment was not accorded any importance.

3.  GW to Lear, 28 August 1794.

4.  WT to Madison. 6 August 1806;  Brown, Glenn 1896, "Dr. William Thornton, Architect." Architectural Record, 1896 , Vol. VI, July-September; Harris, pp. 257-8;   Allen, William, Chapter One: Grandeur on the Potomac, p. 26.

5. See Chapter 12; GW to Commrs. 9 November 1795.

6. Hallet to Commrs. 21 January 1795; Commrs. to Hallet 7 June 1794?;

7. Williamson to Commrs. 5 June 1794.

8. GW to commr. 1 June 1794 ; Commrs. to GW 7 June 1794;  GW to Knox 25 June 1794; GW to Johnson, 27 June 17 1794;  

9. Hallet to Commrs. 23 June 1794; Commrs. to Hallet, 26 June 1794, RG 42 NA; correspondence between Commrs and Hallet described in Commrs to GW, 4 February 1795 footnote 7; Commrs. proceeding 28 June 1794;  

10.   GW to Johnson, 27 June 17 1794; Rivardi to GW 6 May 1794

11. Commrs. to GW, 10 July 1794;  Hanson to GW, 2 August 1790; Clark to GW, 5 Dec 1790; drawing of Clark's State House dome; Greenleaf agreement with Hallet 1 October 1794, in Greenleaf Papers; John Trumbull to Jonathan Trumbull 23 September 1794 as quoted in King, Hadfield

12. List of Houses and Property on Greenleaf's Point, Book 75 Greenleaf's Papers, Wheat Row, four whose shells were built and presumably designed by Clark, were built in the spring of 1795; Appleton to Cranch 21 February 1794; Prentiss to Nicholson 29 February 1796, Nicholson Papers.

13. McBride, Elyse Gundersen, "The Changing Role of the Architect in the American Construction Industry, 1870-1913." Contruction History Vol. 20 no. 1, (2013) p. 125, 131ff. 

14.  Harris p 588; Ridout, pp 28-29, 76, 123;

15. Appleton to Cranch, 2 February 1795, NALC papers; Ford, Notes on Webster, p. 384; Appleton to Greenleaf, 24 September 1794. He moved in with John Templeman who had moved to city from Boston; Appleton to Cranch 21 February 1795.

16. As for the houses Lovering did design and build, he didn't deviate from the pattern provided by London townhouses. An advertisement for the sale of one house Lovering built described it as having “two convenient kitchens, two parlors and six lodging chambers – a brick pavement in front, and the yard and area are paved with brick.” Plus, it had a coach house and stables.  It was determined that Lovering's houses cost $4.50 a square foot to build and Clark's cost $5.50. Contract with Clark, 12 May 1794, Greenleaf papers; In the contract he made with Greenleaf on 8 May 1794, Lovering is described as "late of London." Thanks to the marriage of Lovering's daughter to Dr. John Brereton, some attempts at describing Lovering's life are found in genealogies of the Brereton Family; for description of townhouse developments in London see  Fitzroy Square ; Cranch to his father 25 November 1794; Appleton to Henry, 3 & 9 February 1795; ad in Washington Gazette 22 June 1796.

17. GW to Thomas Sims Lee, 25 July 1794,

18. GW to Lear, 28 August 1794;  Lear to GW,  5 September 1794.

19. Stuart to GW 14 September 1794, reply see footnote 3;  GW Diary 30 September 1794

20. on opinions of old commissioners and hopes for new see Appleton to Webster 26 July 1794, Ford, Notes on NoahWebster, p. 384; Andrew Ellicott to WT, 23 February 1795, Harris p. 296

21. Randolph to Scott 4 October 1794 which is quoted in a footnote to Randolph to GW 6 October 1794; For sale of her house in Philadelphia see Pennsylvania Gazette ad date 25 November 1795.

22. Baltimore Daily Intelligencer 18 October 1794 p. 3; Brown op. cit., pp. 55-6; Ridout, Building the Octagon, p. 61;  Deakins to GW, 27 May 1796.

23.  Commrs to Randolph  19  September 1794;  Randolph to Commrs. 2 October 1794, State Department Domestic Letters; Johnson and Stuart to GW  23 April 1794. 

24. Commrs. Proceedings 1 October 1794; Commrs to Simmonds  25 November 1794;

25. John Trumbull to Jn. Trumbull, 23 Sept. 1793, as quoted in King, Julia, George Hadfield: Architect of the Federal City; GW to Commrs, 27 November 1794; Lear to GW, 17 December 1794.  Commrs. to GW, 18 December 1794 

26. Commrs to GW  4 February 1795; Commrs. to GW,  2 January 1795.

27. WT to Trumbull, 6 January 1795, Harris, p. 291; Trumbull to Hadfield, 9 March 1795, Trumbull Papers, also Harris, p. 304.

28. GW to Carroll, 7 January 1795, reply 13 January 1795.

29. Hallet to Commrs. 21 January 1795, Richmond to Hallet, 20 February 1795.

30. Harris, pp. 305-10; .

31. GW to Commrs, 28 January 1795;  Commrs to GW,  18 February 1795; WT to Lettsom 8 Jan 1795, Pettigrew vol 2 546-9. also see Blodget to WT, 5 January 1796, Harris, pp. 288-9; 

32. footnote to GW to Scott 21 March 1789; Johnson to GW 12 February 1795  ; Carroll to GW 19 February 1795; Stuart to GW 23 February 1795

 

 

32.  Johnson to GW, 23 December 1793,  Johnson to GW, 15 June 1795 ; Johnson and Stuart to GW 23 April 1794  

Judging from a letter Thornton wrote to Lettsom after he wrote to Trumbull, despite his plans to vindicate his original plan, he was in the midst of a rare bout of depression. A month before he had boasted to Lettsom about his work: "the trust reposed in us is so great that I do not know a more extensive power in the offices of our government, except the President, or perhaps the Secretary of State, Treasury and War." In his January letter, he chaffed at his not doing anything and vowed to "institute" a philosophical society as well as agricultural society and university. By the way, he didn't mention undoing "wilful errors."(32)